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DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions were taken from CEN PR-EN 13306 (1998). 
Maintenance: The combination of technical administrative and managerial actions 
during the life cycle of an item, intended to retain it in, or restore to a state where it can 
perform its intended function. 
Dependability: The collective term used to describe availability and its influencing 
factors; reliability, availability and maintenance supportability. (A non quantitative 
measure). 
Availability: The ability of an item to be in a state to perform a required function under 
given conditions at a given instant of time, or for a given interval, assuming that the 
required external resources are provided. 
Reliability: The ability of an item to perform a required function for under given 
conditions for a given time interval. (It can be expressed as a probability). 
Maintainability: The ability of an item, under given conditions of use, to be retained in, 
or restored to a state where it can perform a required function, when maintenance is 
performed under given conditions and using stated procedures and resources. 
Failure: The termination of the ability of an item to perform a required function. (After 
a failure, the item has a FAULT. Failure is an event.) 
Failure Rate: The number of failures of an item in a given time interval divided by that 
time interval. 
Failure Cause: The circumstances associated with design, manufacture, installation, use 
and maintenance, which have led to failure. 
Preventive Maintenance: Maintenance carried out at predetermined intervals or 
according to prescribed criteria and intended to reduce the probability of failure or 
reduce the degradation of the functioning of an item. 
Corrective Maintenance: Maintenance carried out after fault recognition and intended 
to put an item into a state in which it can perform its required function. 
Predictive Maintenance: Condition based maintenance carried out following a forecast 
derived from the analysis and evaluation of the significant parameters of the degradation 
of the item. 
Scheduled Maintenance: Preventive maintenance carried out in accordance with an 
established time schedule or established number of units of use. 
Inspection: Check for conformity by measuring, observing, testing or gauging the 
relevant parameters of an item. (Generally carried out without dismantling) 
Monitoring: Activity performed manually or automatically intended to observe the 
actual state of an item. (Used to evaluate changes in parameters with time). 
Repair: That part of corrective maintenance in which physical actions are taken to 
restore the required function of an item. 
Improvement: The combination of all technical, administrative and managerial actions 
taken to ameliorate the dependability of an item, without changing its required function. 
Modification: The combination of all technical, administrative and managerial actions 
intended to change an item. (It is often a task for the maintenance organization. It 
changes the required function). 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
AHC Active Heave Compensation 
AMV Annulus Master Valve 
BS Blind Stab 
BSC Balanced Scorecard 
CM Condition Monitoring 
CPI  Company Provided Item 
CPRT Control Pod Running Tool 
CR  Company Representatives 
CT Constant Tension 
CVI Closed Visual Inspection 
DMA Dead Man Anchor 
DP  Dynamic Positioning (also DP operator) 
DP Dynamic Positioning 
DPR  Daily progress reports  
ECT Electrical Connector Stab-in Tool 
EFQM  European Excellence Model for Quality Management 
FAT Factory Acceptance Test 
FBF Foundation Base Frame 
FF Fault Finding 
FHR  First Hand Reports 
Fig Figure 
FMD Flooded Member Detection 
GVI General Visual Inspection 
GW Guide Wire 
HAZOP Hazard Operability Study 
HIRA Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
HS Hot Stab 
Hs Significant Wave Height (average of the highest one-third) 
HSE Health Safety and Environment 
IMR Inspection, Maintenance and Repair 
LARS Launch and Recovery Systems 
LC Light Construction 
LJ Levelling Jack 
M&M Maintenance & Modification 
MCM Manifold Control Module 
MH Module Handling 
MHS Module Handling System 
MOC Management of Change 
MODU Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit 
MP  Moon Pool 
MRB Manufacturing Record Book 
MSW Meters of Seawater 
MTTR Mean Time To Repair 
MVA Multi-Variable Analyses 
NAV Navigation 
NCS Norwegian Continental Shelf 
NDT Non-Destructive Testing 
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer 
OR  Offshore Report (job completion report) 
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PBO Performance Based Operation (a type of contract) 
PC Protective Cover 
PLEM Pipeline End Manifold 
PLET Pipeline  End Termination 
PLM Pig Launcher Module 
PMV Production Master Valve 
PO Pigging Operations 
PPE  Personal Protection Equipment 
PRC Pig Receiver Cradle 
PTW Permission To Work 
RLWI Riserless Well Intervention Unit 
ROMV Remotely Operated Motorised Vehicle 
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle 
SCM Subsea Control Module 
SCMRT Subsea Control Module Running Tool 
SIG Significant 
SPI Schedule Performance Index 
SPC Sealine Protection Covers 
SPS Subsea Production Systems 
TMS Tender Management System 
UER Undesirable Event Report 
UTH Umbilical Termination Head 
VO Valve Operations 
WHPS Wellhead Protection Structure 
WOW Waiting on Weather 
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ABSTRACT 
This Masters Thesis covers the Subsea Services industry in Norway. Its objective is to 
identify and evaluate the factors that influence compliance with agreed services delivery 
schedules. The focus is in on services collectively known as “IMR”, a non-standard 
industry acronym for Inspection, Maintenance and Repair. Each refers to groups of 
remote or non-intrusive services, of increasing complexity, that are undertaken on subsea 
production systems, or around them, without taking over control of the well. Similar 
studies could be found in Parts Assembly but not in Subsea Services.  
This 20 years old industry has been growing, driven by the increasing application of 
subsea technology for small to moderate oil-fields, satellite tie-backs and shallow 
reservoirs with physical dimensions longer than the reach of horizontal wells. The North 
Sea leads the world in terms of existing subsea wells and ongoing projects. Maintaining 
the dependability of these assets will become increasingly critical as the proportion of 
hydrocarbons recovered from aging subsea assets increase. 
Each job is normally organised as a short-duration maintenance project involving 
representatives of the Client (the service receiver), OEM vendors, and sub-contracted 
service providers. The IMR Project plans, integrates and supervises the execution of 
these services. It also provides the offshore vessel to access the well. Each of the main 
operators in NCS has between one to three such IMR vessels on long-term hire. The 
smaller operators share vessels. The scarce vessel time is shared between competing jobs 
with different priorities and operating conditions. Delays in service delivery increase 
service costs and reduce regularity and revenues. 
This Master Thesis will attempt to model these delays to provide a basis for the increase 
service efficiency. Their influence factors will be mapped and evaluated, and the methods 
for coping with these factors will be elaborated.  The investigation scope covers IMR 
jobs executed between 2006 and 2008. These influence factors are identified and 
developed through interviews, reviews of literature, standards & practices, procedures 
and job completion reports. The most obvious factors are weather disruption and water 
depth. In addition, the associated complexity and uncertainty are described and 
measured. These factors are validated, analysed and evaluated with a multivariable 
statistical technique, from which a predictive model is proposed.  The model explains 
53% of the variations in schedule performance, points to water depth and weather 
disruption as the most significant influence factors and allows a positive conclusion to be 
reached in six of the eight hypotheses proposed. 
It is expected that an improved understanding of these factors would not only enable 
higher efficiency, but would also free more resources for the increasing service work 
load. These new jobs are increasingly more complex. With the next rounds of IMR 
contracts  due for award in the next few years, a better understanding of the current 
status might contribute to a more robust contracting structure, an even more adaptive 
planning framework and the sustenance of the healthy contractual  relationships between 
parties to the service contract. Finally, as new these projects are being delivered in deeper 
waters, an improved understanding of the complex system can inform the direction of 
innovation and investments to serve these assets to the same level of performance. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Subsea production relies on the on-time delivery of maintenance services on subsea 
assets using ROVs (remotely operated vehicles) and other specialised tools. These 
services are normally outsourced to specialist companies which have the expertise as well 
as specialist tools and methods. These maintenance activities are undertaken on subsea 
production systems (well heads, manifolds, flowline, risers, etc.) to preserve or restore 
their integrity. They are quick response and of relatively short duration. They cover light 
construction activities such as tie-ins and leak clamps. The industry categorises these 
activities into three groups: Inspections, Maintenance and Repair. Inspections are 
executed with ROV carrying appropriate NDT tools. These are statutory and run on a 
five year cycle. Maintenance activities include the replacement of items such as control 
modules as well as the regular cleaning and clearing of subsea assets.  These are recurring, 
standardised and provide information for the program of repairs. Such Repair job-types 
tend to be job-specific and include restorations and modifications. They require 
substantial Engineering input. The industry acronym of IMR (or the equivalent IRM) 
appears to be an attempt to integrate these service lines on one vessel (these 
terminologies are reconciled with standard definitions in section 1.2.2).  
Oil and Gas companies with a sizeable number of subsea assets would need a readily 
available access to an IMR vessel to quickly restore the production flow-path. Spot-hiring 
is possible, but would be more expensive in terms of day-rates and deferments. Thus, big 
operators tend to retain at least one IMR vessel under a long-term contract. Smaller 
operators tend to pool their IMR requirements onto a shared vessel. Both arrangements 
are common in the North Sea and other busy offshore shelves like the Gulf of Mexico 
(GoM), West Africa and Brazil (Interviews with employees of the Main Service Provider, 
a project within a major Subsea Engineering firm,  herein after referred to as “Project”). 
 
1.1 INDUSTRY CHALLENGES 
Broadly speaking, the core service challenges of the subsea industry include project 
delivery lead times, project and service costs, innovating to meet increasing water depths, 
higher pressures and temperatures (HPHT), longer tie-backs, flow assurance and 
handling corrosive fluids. 
1.1.1 Problem formulation 
The focus of this Masters Thesis is on efficiency of service delivery. Many internal and 
external factors can influence the on-time delivery of IMR services. Furthermore, their 
relative influence will be expected to vary from project to project. Some of these factors 
can be predicted and others less so. Regardless of their causes, delays in execution incur 
additional deferments and service charges. To this extent, modelling these factors will be 
a significant contribution to lifecycle regularity management and good basis for managing 
service efficiency. 
1.1.2 Objectives 
The main objective of this Masters Thesis is to provide a basis for the increase in the 
efficiency of IMR services through improved planning and scheduling.  
The associated sub-objectives are 
• To describe the range of IMR subsea services provided,  
• To review the IMR jobs delivered in 2006, 2007 and 2008 to provide data for 
statistical multivariable analyses. 
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• To map the influence factors acting on IMR schedule performance;  
• To analyse historical data with statistical multivariable analyses and deliver a model 
for the prediction of schedule performance of IMR subsea services.  
• To evaluate the significance of these influence factors and explore the methods for 
managing them.  
 
A better understanding of the current status might contribute to a more robust 
contracting structure, an even more adaptive planning framework and the sustenance of 
the healthy relationships between all the interested parties. Finally, modelling the 
complex system can inform the direction of innovation and investments to serve these 
assets. Other measures that could have strategic or competitive value to Client or Project 
will be highlighted, if any. Finally, the opportunities for improving the study will be 
discussed. 
1.1.3 Methodology 
Historical data on IMR jobs executed in the three years between 2006 and 2008 is 
collected, collated, coded and reviewed. It will serve as the basis of this research study. A 
number of statistical multi-factor studies are available, but none is readily accessible in 
the area of subsea IMR industry. Thus, a method for coding factors such as complexity 
and uncertainty is developed specifically for this Masters Thesis. Interviews, related 
literature, job reports and procedures provided much guidance. Using MS Excel multi-
variable regression analyses, these factors will be evaluated for significance, contribution 
and sensitivity. The procedures, plans and processes (hereinafter referred to as 
“methods”) for managing the statistically relevant factors are further explored. 
1.1.4 Research limitations  
This approach assumes a linear regression model. Thus, some important dynamic or 
random terms may not be properly represented. This Master Thesis’ focus is on 
compliance with project schedules and the range of task-related and environmental 
factors that could influence them. Service content is not considered and is assumed 
acceptable for each job. Service costs are also outside the scope of the investigation even 
though these tend to be driven by time spent on jobs. Complexity is viewed in five 
dimensions and uncertainty three. It is possible that other important variables may have 
been excluded. The final sections of the report consider how these might be introduced 
in future studies. 
 
1.2 SUBSEA TECHNOLOGY TRENDS 
Developments over the last two decades have had increasing proportion of subsea 
technology. Experts believe that large O&G fields that can justify their own fixed 
platforms are few these days; and the giant fields of the size of Troll and Gullfaks have 
all been found. Medium-sized satellite fields are quite amenable to subsea concepts. They 
can easily and cheaply be tied to existing processing capacities in older host platforms 
(e.g. Fram, Tordis, Vilje etc); and can be brought on stream very quickly (Nergaard, 
2007).  Another driver is the increasing water depths at which reservoirs are being 
exploited. For a given reserve size, below a certain depth, it becomes increasing 
uneconomic to use fixed platforms, in favour of subsea wells flowing to floating 
structures. Even shallow fields with a very broad reservoir extent, i.e. longer than the 
reach of horizontal wells, could be developed with subsea technology to improve the well 
drainage (Odland, 2007). Thus, the number of subsea wells in the North Sea as well as 
worldwide has been growing rapidly, as shown in Figure 1.0. 
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Figure 1.0: Expected growth in subsea wells (Dreischler, 2007)
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Northern Europe (NE) has the highest number of subsea wells in operation and this is 
expected to remain so in the next five years. StatoilHydro is the biggest subsea well 
operator in the world (Dreichsler, 2008). Not surprisingly, projects under construction 
also show a similar trend: Europe is developing a higher number of subsea projects 
(Youngson, 2007). Figure 1.1 shows the number of projects. Each project could have as 
few as 8 wells and as many as 48 wells.   
A well completed on the surface of a platform (called “dry” completion) can deliver a 
higher recovery rate than one completed subsea. To compete favourably in terms of 
ultimate recovery, the subsea well requires quite a lot of intervention and IOR services 
(Nergaard, 2007; Odland, 1996). As the wells age, service requirements increase 
substantially. The range of services includes inspection and repair activities on the 
wellhead, around the well and inside the tubing. Unlike problems inside the tubing, the 
generic inspection and survey activities are usually not associated with production 
deferments. However, many wellhead failures may require the interruption of production 
until a suitable maintenance solution is found and implemented. Examples of these 
include problems with electrical and hydraulic jumpers, the subsea control modules, 
manifold control modules and choke modules (together, these are called modules).   
Depending on the task, there are several methods for subsea well maintenance and through 
tubing intervention. Through tubing activities are executed with the tubing in place. They 
can be achieved with the aid of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODU the most 
expensive, but there are different sizes), or with Riser less Well Intervention (RLWI) 
Units. In both cases, the vessel takes control of the well and sends tools through the 
tubing to undertake maintenance. These may range from simple sand cleanout to tubing 
replacement. The industry categorizes these into A, B and C as shown in Figure 1.2 
(Drechsler, 2008). 
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Figure 1.1: Reported subsea installation 
projects per region (Youngson, 2007)  
 
Fig 1.3: Options for Subsea Well InterventionFigure 1.2: Options for subsea well intervention( Dreischsler, 2008)
 
The IMR Industry is another level below these Well Intervention categories. The core of 
their activities is the use of Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) to execute light 
activities around the well (but not inside it). The size and capability of the support vessel 
is also smaller than the RLWI vessel. A typical IMR Vessel is shown below in Figure 1.3. 
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  Fig 1.3: Project IMR vessel 
 
1.2.1 Subsea system dependability 
Dependability is the collective term used to describe availability and its influencing factors; 
reliability, availability and maintenance supportability (CEN, PR-EN 13306, 1998, see 
Definitions). Availability improvements can be achieved by making failures less likely (i.e. 
reliability) and by making the subsequent restorations very prompt. The latter is the focus 
of this study.  
As shown in Figure 1.4, Roberts (2001) expects rates of failure in installed subsea assets 
to follow the well known Bath-tube curve (Aven, 1991). This is also the experience of 
employees of the Project (Interviews).  Early-life failure rates are usually quite high. Some 
of these can be identified by testing, before installation and during the commissioning 
(many are covered under warranties). Adequate pre-installation testing is the preferred 
option. However, due to their complex and time varying nature, a complete and accurate 
simulation of actual subsea operating conditions can be a challenge. There are several 
factors that would need to be represented e.g. pressure, flow, third-party activities, subsea 
forces, waves, currents, temperature, expansion, etc (ISO Standard 13628-1). Roberts 
(2001) expects that when design and testing improves, we will see a flatter early-life 
failure rate (see Figure 1.4). Such extensive testing is already available today. For instance, 
K-Lab has been testing the Subsea Compressor for Åsgard and Ormen Lange under 
representative conditions (Tendre, 2008).  
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Useful life
Figure 1.4: Typical failure pattern of subsea
facilities – Bath-tub curve ( Roberts et al, 2001)
 
As the water depth at which subsea production systems are installed increase, and as the 
proportion of hydrocarbons produced from these assets increase, their maintenance 
criticality would increase (Norse Z-008), and reliability would become even more 
important for regularity (Roberts et al., 2001). The first generation of subsea assets had 
far higher reliability problems than the ones of today. For example the Oil & Gas 
company BP experience with failures and their consequences up to 2001 is shown in 
Table 1.0 (Roberts et al., 2001) 
 
Table 1.0:  BP early experience of subsea failures (Roberts et al, 2001).
Project Failure Mode Direct Cost Downtime
Foinaven Super Duplex (Steel Pipe) Cracking $55m 10 months
Foinaven (Valve) Stem seal leakage $30m 4 months
Schiehallion 13 SCM subsea control modules suffering hydraulic 
fluid leakage; 9 modules changed out.
$9m
Troika Replacement of 8 connectors. Deferred production 
and minor leakage.
$20m
 
Subsea wells have a lower level of oil recovery compared to dry trees (Odland, 1996). 
Thus, the potential gain for an effective subsea maintenance and intervention is 
substantial. The quantity and proportion of oil tied to the availability of an effective and 
prompt subsea intervention would increase even more as the proportion of wells that are 
installed subsea increases with time.  
In the 365 jobs reviewed as part of this Thesis, there were at least 50 module 
replacements with failures which are similar to the ones shown in Table 1.0. Each change 
normally takes around 2 to three days, using standardised procedures. The OEM running 
and retrieving tools are accessible. The personnel from OEM plus a replacement module 
can be taken on board quickly. Thus, the associated downtime for each replacement has 
improved significantly from months to weeks and days. Given that, where can further 
efficiencies be derived from?  Are they even necessary? 
Control modules are replaced on failure or incipient failure. The equipment performance 
is monitored (directly or indirectly) but their condition is not. Their typical lifetime is 
between 3 to 5 years. When a module performance is observed to have degraded the unit 
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is isolated and intervention requested. The well is often interrupted so the job would 
carry a high priority. The entire module is eventually replaced using the IMR Vessel. The 
modules have complex electrical, electronic and hydraulic internal components. 
Specialised diagnostics must be done to detect the fault. Thus, compared to repairing the 
offshore, modular replacement minimises the MTTF. The replacement modules are kept 
in stock. If possible, the degraded module is also repaired by the OEM and returned to 
stock.  
A run-to-failure philosophy suggests that there is no benefit to be gained from 
preventive maintenance e.g. replacing the units before actual failure (based on condition 
or expected lifetime). Indeed, from Z-008 (generic maintenance program), that approach 
means that each individual control module failure is considered to be low-risk.  Of the 
three replacement models available, choosing to replace on failure indicates a strong 
belief that “a new module is only as good as an old one”. That is the module failure rate 
is following an exponential distribution with a constant failure rate. This is represented 
by the flat portion of the Bath-tub curve in Figure 1.4 (Aven, 1991). This has at least two 
implications.  
First, it is possible to calculate the number of modules that is required to be retained in 
stock, based on the installed inventory and the constant failure rate plus a safety factor. 
This is not within the scope of this Masters Thesis. Second, given a stable operation, an 
installed base and known failure rate, two possible options are available for reducing the 
production loss due to the subsea failures (a) improve the reliability of the modules 
through partnerships with the OEM (b) improve the efficiency of their replacement on 
failure. Reliability improvements are not within the scope of this Masters Thesis but 
ensuring efficient maintenance intervention is. 
Finally, even if each unit failure may be considered low risk, the overall dependability of 
the entire subsea production system is very important for the regularity of production. 
Norsok Z-016 recommends that this must be managed as a lifecycle project. This 
Masters Thesis is a contribution to that. 
1.2.2 The meaning of IMR 
IMR stands for Inspection, Maintenance and Repair. It is unclear how the industry 
acronym came into use. In the 7th Underwater Technology Conference of 1992, the 
earlier and equivalent version of it (IRM) was already in use (Sørheim, 1992). It seems 
that the Project and the industry switched to IMR around 2000 onwards.  The acronym 
does capture the essence of the business of the Project. However, it is not consistent 
with the standard definition of maintenance “technical administrative actions intended to 
retain or restore the equipment or system to a functional state”. (CEN Pr-13306, 1998). 
This definition would include all the offshore activities of IMR. It would also include the 
engineering support tasks as well as the project management and scheduling. The study 
Project as well as similar ones in the industry is aware of the standard definition. Thus, it 
is intriguing, at least, to consider why this particular combination was adopted and what 
it signifies. 
Let us consider the range of activities the IMR industry classifies under the headings of 
I-type, M-type and R-type.  Inspection or I-type activities normally covers scheduled 
condition monitoring activities such as Structural Inspection, Pipeline Inspection, 
Corrosion Monitoring, Visual (GVI and CVI, general visual and close visual inspection 
respectively) etc. Equipment requirement is often limited to the ROV and NDT (non-
destructive testing) tools.  Most of these are statutorily required for the retention of the 
platform certificate. Thus, they are fairly routine, highly-standardized and are planned so 
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that the required volume of inspection is completed within the certification cycle of, say, 
five years (Bayliss, 1988).  An IMR vessel could combine these with more the more 
difficult R-type an M-type activities, or simply focus on routine inspections.  
On the other hand, activities falling under M-type tend to be scheduled restorations or 
interventions arising from earlier condition monitoring activities or performance 
degradation reported by the asset owners. These would include the replacements of 
anodes, modules (SCM/MCM or Choke), jumpers and Subsea pump. Also included here 
is the clearing of debris, fishing nets etc., left by third parties.  With the exception of 
these latter house-keeping activities, the replacement of modules categorised under M-
type are consistent with the standard definition of Corrective Maintenance (NORSOK 
Z-008, CEN Pr-13306, 1998). They are also more difficult to undertake than I-type 
activities at least in three respects. Firstly, they require more equipment, such as running 
tools, for the removal and replacement of the modules. Secondly, they have a stricter 
weather limitation due to the heavier lifting requirements. Thirdly, they tend to take 
longer to execute because they involve more procedural steps and require more 
placement precision. For instance, the MCM must be placed at a particular receptacle, 
with a particular orientation and under certain favourable sea conditions. 
The distinction between R-type and M-type activities is less clear. Under R-type, one 
might find the repair of broken caisson or conductor; repair of riser guides, template 
hatches, locks and hinges; replacement of corroded caissons; arrest of propagating cracks 
and clamping of leaking pipes. These activities are clearly Repair activities but are also 
considered Corrective Maintenance by NORSOK Z-008. What sets them apart from M-
type is the fact that R-type activities “often require custom-made solutions and tooling”. 
For instance, to change each type of module, there are standardised procedures and 
running tools. These tools are pre-manufactured and supplied by OEM at field 
development. The Client retains the OEM for the operation and maintenance of these 
running tools. Thus, the running tools should be readily available. This does not apply to 
the clamping of leaks or the replacement of guideposts. For such R-type activities, 
considerable engineering input is required to develop very job-specific methods, select 
the most appropriate tool-type and customise them to the job. These make R-type 
activities more difficult to plan and more difficult to execute. They also require more 
planning lead-times. 
In summary, it would appear that whereas the maintenance standards base the definition 
of the term “maintenance” on the totality of activities required to retain or restore the 
functioning of an item, the IMR industry has distinguished these activities into I, M and 
R types based on the difficulty, effort, lead time, customization etc., required to 
undertake them. In subsequent sections, we will link these to job complexity.  
 
Recurring Special Clean&Clear Modules Clamping Replace
Scheduled
Unscheduled
Opportunistic
Figure 1.6 Reconciliation of Norsok definition of "Maintenance" & IMR terminology
NORSOK 
(Maintenance 
covers all)
Basic tools and 
procedures
I-type M-type R-type
Inspection Restoration & Replacement
Engineered tools and 
procedures
Standardized tools & 
procedures
Increasing Difficulty
Increasing
Frequency
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1.2.3 Industry structure 
A long-term IMR contract is a guaranteed source of steady revenue for a service 
provider. Thus the evolving business has attracted traditional Subsea Construction firms 
(Subsea 7, Acergy, Technip); Subsea Services firms (e.g. DOF Subsea, Deep Ocean); 
Equipment and Package suppliers (Aker Solutions and more recently FMC through 
Schilling ROV); traditional Survey & Diving Companies (SouthSeas, Neptune Diving).   
Each Contract provides three groups of competences and requirements. The first is the 
marine intervention equipment, tools and staff. This is usually concretized through an 
offshore capable vessel complete with, manning, a suitable AHC crane, MHS, ROVs and 
standard tools specified on the contract.  
The second is Project Management and Engineering Support. This is required to 
integrate a wide range of service disciplines effectively, efficiently and safely to get the 
job done. A very broad range of activities are executed under the IMR roof. These 
include asset integrity, structure construction, civil dredging, electrical trouble shooting 
etc. To optimise vessel time on wells and facilities, these activities are integrated into a 
series of multi-discipline projects than can be executed under one campaign.  
The nature of the business increasingly favours firms with subsea facility construction 
and / or integration experience. This is even more so as we move from the routine jobs 
to the more demanding repair jobs (M-type and R-type). Traditional survey companies 
must bring in this technical competence to be competitive in the repair category. In 
addition, knowledge of the Client facilities is often very useful. As there are wide range of 
packages installed on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (Aker, FMC, Vetco Gray) OEM 
support is often required for module handling. 
The third group of competence required is that of survey and NDT. These cover a broad 
range of recurring activities such a structure and pipeline inspection and corrosion 
protection checks. Before the growth of the subsea industry, these were the main 
occupation of the survey companies. Thus competence in this area is widely available. 
Even then, some specialised tools can be hired in e.g. Welaptega for in-service chain and 
rope monitoring (see Figure 1.8). 
The study Project is an integrated one. The Project supplies all the three requirements 
(Marine Vessel, Project Management and Engineering Support as well as Inspection & 
Survey capability). This is the common approach in the North Sea, but it is not always 
the approach adopted worldwide. Instead, some Clients may prefer to retain the PMS 
(Project Management Service) & Engineering support in-house. The marine equipment 
& tools which may represent up to 90% of the total value would then be outsourced. 
This arrangement is just as common as the integrated option and has the advantage of 
Client retention the engineering skills in-house. A leading offshore operator in South 
America, with decades of subsea experience, adopts this type.  
1.2.4 Project being studied 
The Project has been providing IMR Services for the Client under this current contract 
for nearly ten years. The Project activities cover Engineering Support, Project 
Management and Offshore Execution of the jobs using a dedicated vessel. This vessel is 
one of the three the Client has on her operation. The other two are owned by other IMR 
service providers. The Client retains control over the schedule of each of the vessels. 
Jobs are sent to the Projects well in advance. These are then planned by in-house, 
resources from engineering, OEM, Client and subcontractors that may be required. The 
estimated budget and other resources are included with a proposed procedure, and then 
forwarded to the Client for review and approval.  
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Recurring inspections require little or no engineering input. Non-routine and unique jobs 
require extensive engineering support. They are then taken through the HAZOP (Hazard 
and Operability Studies) process. Then the Approved for Construction (AFC) procedure is 
sent to the Vessel for execution. Daily operations are supervised on location by a team 
including a Senior Project Engineer, a Project Engineer, the Offshore Manager and 
Client representatives. Jobs requiring installation of modules and use of specialised 
equipment will also include OEM representatives. The Project Managers review daily 
operations with the team every morning, and help them resolve difficulties and conflicts. 
They provide resources for the process and quality-check the entire operation on an 
ongoing basis. 
 
1.3 PROJECT IMR VESSEL 
The Project IMR vessel is fitted AHC (Active Heave Compensated) cranes. The main 
AHC crane is rated to 50T in normal operation but can be operated to 100T in close 
boom and without AHC.   
There are two ROVs (one work-class ROV and one observation ROV). To ensure high 
vessel utilisation, each of these units are deigned to be deployable at maximum significant 
wave height (Hs) of 5m. The workROV is a 100HP hydraulically powered autonomous 
underwater vehicle equipped with 5 & 7 function manipulators with hydraulic, electrical, 
mechanical and electronic interfaces. It can accept a skid (related equipment on same 
foundation) of up to 2500Kg. It is fitted with 7 thrusters, 6 real time video cameras and 
automatic control for heading (1degree), depth and altitude (60mm). The obsROV is a 
scaled down version of the workROV equipped with 6 thrusters, 4 video channels. Both 
ROVs have enough umbilical to be launched to a depth of 1500m. They have up to 
200m Tether Management System (TMS). 
The Module Handling System (MHS) guides modules through the splash zone. They can 
safely launch and land modules (max weight 34T and size 5 x 3.7 x 7.6m) at subsea 
locations at 3.5m Hs and a wave period of 8 seconds. The system is able to recover same 
at up to 4.5m Hs. It allows operation down to 400m water depth with a winch capacity 
of 760m. It has 3 guide wire winches rated 5T each, a deck skidding system, and a 
vertical tower.  
In the past seven years, there has been a gradual, but significant improvement in the area 
of vessel weather tolerability. Many of these have been implemented in the Project vessel. 
Included here are moonpools for ROV launch and retrieval, DP (dynamic positioning), 
Damping Systems and AHC (Hovland, 2007). 
Moonpools usage can be extended to ROV deployment. In the Project vessel, a 
dedicated side deployment system is used for the ROVs. Moonpools are normally 
positioned at the least wave prone area of the vessel i.e. the middle. Special designs use 
air bubble to lighten water column and reduce waves etc. This avoids splashing which 
can interrupt operations in high waves. Structurally, moonpools increase resistance of 
ships to waves, removes buoyancy, but increase stability (Hovland, 2007). 
1.3.1 Operational limitations 
As IMR vessels operate in an offshore environment, they are exposed to wave, wind, 
icing and temperature extremes. These events are not always easy to predict (e.g. due to 
polar lows, weather forecasting accuracy and their sheer stochastic nature). Each vessel is 
given a set of operational limit. Their operation must be planned and executed within 
these.  
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Wave height is the most important in the North Sea whereas wind speed tends to be the 
main concern in the Barents Sea (Hovland, 2007).  Considering wave heights, we find 
that in practice, there are several limits depending on the tool and equipment required for 
the operation. 
 
Table 1.1: Weather Limitation of Project Vessel (source job procedure) 
Handling of item Allowable 
seastate 
Notes/Limiting criteria 
General ROV operation  Hs = 4.5 m* Contract 
General MHS Operation Hs = 3.5 m** Structural strength 
General Deck Handling Hs = 3.5 m Safety of personnel & equipment 
*) Can be increased to Hs = 5.0m on free heading and otherwise favourable conditions 
**) Can be increased to Hs = 4.0m on free heading and otherwise favourable conditions 
 
As shown in Table 1.1, the Project vessel has maximum operational Hs of 4.5m – 5.0m 
for the most general ROV operations such as Conditioning Monitoring, Fault Finding 
and Valve Operations. These operations are relatively easy to schedule as the areas of 
Operation (North Sea and Norwegian Sea) have high probabilities of having the seastate 
below 5m (see Table 1.2). When the seastate approaches this realm, one would expect 
that these operations would be prioritised. Operations requiring Module Handling (3.5m) 
and Foundation Base Frame (2.5m) are less tolerant. Their required windows are also 
harder to find. 
% of Yr Seastate Below
Hs (m) Tp (s) 5m Hs 3m Hs
Southern North Sea 8.8 9.8 98 83
Northern North Sea 10.8 circ 14.0 91 64
Norwegian Sea 11.5 circ 15.5 91 67
Grand Banks 10.5 13.5 93 65
Southern Barents Sea 10.0 14.7 95 75
Eastern Barents Sea circ 9.4 14.1 96 80
One Year Return
Table 1.2:  Average statistics for wave height and wave period (Hovland, 2007)
 
The industry has been gradually increasing the weather tolerability of IMR vessels. In 
the 2005 round of contracts (Statoil and Shell), this was increased to 5m Hs. Hovland 
(2007) reports that diminishing returns sets in for investments in ROV higher weather 
tolerability (through installation of AHC LARS) at about 6m, using 2007 technology. 
As shown in Figure 1.7, the annual probabilities of exceedance flatten out from around 
6m levels.  
A very good description of LARS is available on 
http://www.seaeye.com/lars.html 
 
Factors Influencing On-Schedule Delivery of IMR Subsea Services 
Efosa Emmanuel Uyiomendo. 
21  
 
HovelandE., 2007
Annual Probability of Exceedanceof Sig. Wave HeightsFig 1.7
Figure 1.7: Annual probability of exceedance of 
significant wave heights (Hovland, 2007)
 
 
1.4 TYPICAL WORK LOCATION 
1.4.1 Design considerations 
Bruset (1992) outlined the important considerations for unmanned underwater 
intervention in the Norwegian Continental Shelf. He defined interventions to mean IMR 
(inspection, maintenance and repair) activities requiring ROVs, ROT (remotely operated 
tool) that are wire suspended and wire-guided for, say, replacement of control modules. 
Such operations will also include complimentary systems such as hatch operations tools, 
guide wires, hydraulic valve operation tools mounted on ROV, water jets for cleaning 
and extended manipulator arms for debris removal etc. The design requirements for 
successful underwater interventions include:  
Replaceability: production-critical components with relatively high failure rates should be 
designed for easy, independent replacement e.g. through modularisation. Thus control 
module with fragile electronics and hydraulics are designed for easy ROT retrieval using a 
mono-hull vessel. Similarly, guide posts are designed for easy operation of their locking 
mechanisms using ROV. Electrical and hydraulic distribution systems are designed with 
ROV operated connectors. Structural elements such as hatches are also replaceable and 
operable with guide wires, assisted by ROVs. 
Access: this must be sufficient for all reasonable operations and association manoeuvring. 
Required access is usually evaluated against the type of work, the tool required, ROV 
type, distance to task site and conditions at site. The need for manipulators, waterjets and 
torque tools increases space requirement.  Workclass ROV is much bigger than 
observation ROV. And availability of snagging points, proximity to seabed and reduced 
visibility would all increase space requirements. These assessments and considerations 
need to be done as part of overall system analysis so that adequate space is provided 
during design.  
Colour and marking system: this is of utmost importance for safe and efficient operation. 
They guide navigation through: (i) structure identification & orientation (ii) equipment 
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mounted thereon (iii) relative position of parts of structure (iv) components and 
intervention interfaces (v) equipment status e.g. valves open or close. Much time can be 
spent verifying these in the absence of clear and unambiguous markings. The preferred 
colour is yellow. 
Status indicators: these should be provided for all valves and connectors in a manner that is 
easily readable by pilot camera. 
Work platforms and grabber bars: these should be provided for workROV in locations where 
manipulative tasks may be expected to be done. 
Snagging points: these must be minimized for umbilical, tethers and wires. Bridges should 
be built across opening to avoid traps. 
The forgoing implies that the conditions of site should be amenable to execution of 
maintenance activities. If this assumption holds, differences in the levels of difficulty of 
executed activities would depend on the activity types, the tools & procedures deployed 
and not the site conditions. This assumption is important because jobs executed across 
dozens of different subsea production systems will be analysed. 
1.4.2 Standardization of subsea control systems 
The industry recognised very early the need for the standardization of the Subsea 
Control Systems (SCS) at least on the following areas: 
(a) Physical dimensions: SCM diameter is critical to Christmas tree layout. The maximum 
total height will influence guide-post dimensions and could determine the profile of the 
rather short horizontal trees. Weight had to be low to allow ROV intervention. 
(b) Christmas tree interface: Landing base, lock-down connector and running tool interface 
including ROV interface for running tool operation. The applicable running tool and its 
interface can be very module-specific.  
(c) Component level standardization based on functional requirements from Clients. 
(d) Control and monitoring requirements optimized for system surveillance and fault 
diagnostics, including signal and power interface to the more accurate quartz sensors. 
External sensors monitored at SCM include Xmas Tree wellhead P &T, downhole P &T, 
Choke downstream P&T, Xmas Tree sand detector, leak detector and multiphase 
flowmeter. Standardisation of these meant the industry had to specify a communication 
protocol for modules.  
(e) Shock and vibration tolerance. 
The supplier need for market protection and the pool of existing installation was also 
recognised as a hindrance. However where this is a concern, the author proposed that at 
the very least, each supplier should standardise within its own range things like locking 
mechanisms and running tools. Clients tend to specify the same OEM for each field 
which allows one running tool to be used field wide (Polden, 1994). A quick overview of 
the industry today indicates that that there has been little or no standardisation beyond 
Xmas Tree interfaces. OEMs use vendor specific standards to defend their market share. 
1.4.3 Common failure modes in subsea systems 
Along with water depth, the chosen intervention philosophy can play a large role in the 
design of subsea control system. Intervention refers to the planned or unplanned 
removal of subsea equipment from its normal operating position and its re-installation 
and hook-up.   
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There are five common forms of subsea control system (Nergaard, 2007).  :  
Direct hydraulic system: hydraulic power and power control from surface 
Pilot operated hydraulic system: with hydraulic power from Surface, hydraulic control signals 
from surface 
Electro-hydraulic System: where hydraulic power and electric control from surface or host 
platform 
Mux-Electro-Hydraulic System: Both hydraulic power and electric control signals from 
surface or host platform, distributed from a control module subsea. 
All-Electric control system: where all power and signal is electric, valve actuation and control 
is electric and there is local hydraulic power generation  
The North Sea has favoured the electro-hydraulic system (not shown) followed by the 
Mux-electro-hydraulic control system (Nergaard, 2007).  For such subsea control systems 
the most common failure modes are related to the hydraulic and electrical distribution 
systems. These are often as the results of mechanical damage of hoses and cables e.g. by 
fishing trawlers, other impact or water ingress. Failure of the subsea electronics is 
extremely rare with lifetimes at least four times the prediction (Trett, 1994). 
1.4.4 Operations experience and best practice 
Bruset (1992) lists some operations and developments experience in unmanned 
underwater operations. These include: 
Protective covers: From experience with Gullfaks drill string operated protective covers 
(PC), the Operator decided to use covers operable with indirect wire pull. This had been 
recognised to have several merits: isolates vessel heave motion, ROV operable, no direct 
transfer of wire tension which protects the PC, flexible pull positions. Taken together, 
these reduce opening and closing operations from hours to around 20minutes. 
Guidewire operations: Several guide wire anchors were developed by Statoil, all of which can 
be established & transferred by a free flying ROV without coming to the surface, saving 
operational time. This technique has been extended from their use for PC operations to 
the handing and running operations. The module running and retrieval system still in use 
to this date is based on this. 
ROV valve operations: Low torque valve operations (<50Nm and single turn) is done with 
valve handle. Higher torque or turns is done with torque tool which must first be 
calibrated to the valve and ROV. Low torque safety precautions include use of ROV 
platforms and valve panel. These isolate valve from damaging forces and mechanical 
stops. The torque tool is quite complex. In addition to calibration requirements, the valve 
itself must have damage torque greater than 30% of maximum torque of the torque tool, 
or twice for small torque ranges i.e. 50Nm or less. 
Electrical & hydraulic systems: These have been the most vulnerable. Thus, early 
development efforts ensured that a broad range of connections can be done with ROV, 
especially in multi-well templates. These ROV based system offers the advantages of (i) 
improved reliability due to fewer connectors’ count (ii) reduced tolerance requirements 
(iii) reduced cost (iv) reduced installation cost as workROV can be used to mate 
connectors during idle time (v) efficient fault finding on a single line can be carried out 
using ROV (vi) efficient line replacement (vii) flexible, lines can be re-arranged in the 
future. 
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Table 1.3: Requirements for Subsea Intervention (Adapted from Trett, 1994). 
No Intervention Type Required 
Access 
Implication 
1 Component replacement e.g. 
control module 
Vertical  Subsea structure &  guide 
post design 
2 Hydraulic / electric distribution 
connections 
Horizontal  Edge location for easy 
access 
3 Valve operations (e.g. choke 
valve, isolation valve) 
Horizontal  Edge location for easy 
access 
4 Umbilical pull-in and connection Horizontal + 
Heavy  Lift  
ROV connector design  
 
Corrosion Problems: These are less frequent than electro-hydraulic faults. They arise only 
when the protective anode clamps or earth bonding are not well secured and not as a 
result of material selection.  
Hydraulic component failure is just as rare as electronic component failure. Should either 
happen, retrieval of entire module would be necessary. To facilitate in-situ interventions 
for, say, hydraulic and electric cable replacements, ROV  access is crucial.  Typical tasks 
and the type of access required are shown in table 1.3. 
1.4.5 Life cycle considerations 
Operators or Clients must balance the capital and operating costs of their installations. 
The majority of the subsea completed wells in the Norwegian Continental Shelf lie 
around the upper end of the 70m to 350m (Bruset, 1992). The UK sector is shallower 
and has favoured the simpler diver installed and retrieved equipment. This type is 
possible for very reliable systems installed not more than 80meters of water depth. They 
are cheap to install but expensive to run due to the requirement for a specialised diving 
vessel. Most fields in the Norwegian sector are deeper than the diving limit and have 
favoured the diver-less installations. These are more expensive to install but require a less 
specialised vessel. Even in 1994, Life cycle considerations were  already influencing 
choices as the frontier moved into deeper waters. This was necessary because in deep 
waters reliability, availability, capital and operating costs are much more difficult to trade-
off. Each of them becomes too important (Trett, 1994).  
 
1.5 DESCRIPTION OF TYPICAL IMR JOBS 
1.5.1 Inspection 
The Vessel Work-Class ROV is configured to deliver all types of inspection and survey 
normally undertaken offshore, using various tools such as GVI/CVI, Sonar, Gyro, MRU, 
Altimeter, NAV, Bathymetry, Pipe Tracker, Side Scan, Survey, Multi-beam, Cathodic 
Protection,  Flooded Member Detection (FMD), Crack detection/measurement  with 
Eddy current, MPI, X-ray (Project Technical Specification).  
The Work-Class ROV can also deploy special tools such as the Welaptega Chain 
Monitoring System (see Figure 1.7). This is a DNV approved Condition Monitoring 
System that can the executed for anchor chains and anchor ropes in service. It is 
deployed by a workROV. The frame-held tool is positioned by the 5-function 
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manipulator. The tool consists of 4 video cameras positioned at calibrated locations by 
the 7-function manipulator. Together they acquire high resolution, synchronous and 
calibrated digital images of the chains. These images are corrected for spatial geometry 
and used to generate statistically reliable measurements of chain dimensions. The chain 
must be cleaned to a certain extent before deployment. http://welaptega.com/cms.php 
 
Fig 1.8: Waleptega Chain Monitoring
Figure 1.8: Waleptega chain monitoring system  
1.5.2 Maintenance replacement of control module 
The “pod” is the general term for subsea control module (SCM), manifold control 
module (MCM) and flow control module (FCM). Other modules inside the wellhead 
template such as the choke module and subsea accumulator module are less typically 
referred to as “pod”. We shall refer to all of them as “control  module” or simply 
“module”. However, they are all retrievable by IMR Vessel using the MHS and the 
standardised procedures that have now become well practised. Usually, the OEM of the 
particular module installed would be available for the operation of the module-specific 
running tool and the quality control of the operation. Three types of modules are 
common in the Client installation: FMC, Aker Solutions and Vetco Gray. Thus, the 
typical procedure would need to be adjusted to suit the module type installed as well as 
the actual type of protective cover (PC) on the wellhead template.  
1.5.3 Light construction 
An example of a Light Construction activity is now described. The objective was to 
relocate a spool along the seabed to relieve tension on the hubs. This was the first time 
such operation was performed with Project vessel. A survey had been done to map out 
spool profile on the seabed during installation of the spool. Because of the very high 
level of accuracy required to determine the spool offset, its accurate position was re-
measured before the spool was relocated.  
Factors Influencing On-Schedule Delivery of IMR Subsea Services 
Efosa Emmanuel Uyiomendo. 
26  
 
1.5.4 Innovative operation 
The Client would like to recover a 71.3Te Desander from a 200feet deep subsea 
production system from time to time.  Normally the sand from this well would be 
pumped into an injection well but this option had become unavailable. The Project was 
requested to check the feasibility of recovering a filled de-sander and installing another 
one. Normally the Project Vessel would be limited to a maximum load of 35Te (for MH 
job types). To accommodate this unusual operation some modifications were proposed 
for consideration (see appendix). 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 REGULATIONS RELATING TO INSPECTION 
There has been an increase in Inspection Regulations since 1965, as table 2.1 shows. Up 
to 1988, Legislation concerning inspection focused more on underwater structures and 
pipelines. They are more expensive to do and could potentially cause more safety, 
environmental and marine impact. On the other hand, the operators had far more 
incentive to inspect topside production equipment because of the revenue objective 
Bayliss et al., 1988). 
Table 2.1:  History of offshore Inspection Regulations (Adapted from Bayliss et al., 1988) 
Year Sector Regulation Objective 
1965 UK Mineral Workings 
(Offshore Installations) 
Authority of State to regulate safety 
of offshore facilities 
1974 UK Offshore Installations 
(Construction & Survey) 
Regulations on standards for 
platform design, construction & 
survey to maintain certification 
1977 UK Guide on technical 
standards for certification. 
Appointed 6 Certifying organisations 
including DNV, Bureau Veritas, 
Lloyds, Amer Bureau of Shipping 
1976 Norway Royal Decree legislating 
underwater inspection 
This requires underwater inspection 
for offshore facilities 
1977 Norway Petroleum Directorate 
guideline on inspection 
Appointed DNV to undertake 
surveys and recertification on behalf 
of the state. 
 
As shown in Table 2.1, the state nominated certifying bodies normally publish the 
guidelines for managing the inspection process. To retain its certificate the structure must 
be inspected periodically and operated according to pre-approved manual. This requires 
prior notification of all changes, conditions and plans that could inform a special survey. 
The periodic surveys are optimised through a risk-based selection of portions of the 
underwater structures for inspection. These are rotated each time so that the structure is 
covered in 5 years to align with the 5yearly recertification.  
Even then, when compared to UK equivalent, the survey requirements for DNV can be 
very extensive. It includes: 
• Structure: General Visual Inspection (GVI) of selected parts of to determine 
general condition and inform selection of areas for detailed inspection. This is 
normally followed by a detailed inspection and non-destructive testing (NDT) of 
selected portions of the Structure 
• Corrosion Protection: Detailed inspection, NDT and testing to determine the 
condition of the system. 
• Foundation and Scour Protection System: general condition monitoring 
• Structure: inspection to check and control the incidence of marine growth and 
other debris. Should this occur, cleaning and debris removal is done. 
• Special surveys i.e. those triggered by an accidental damage, or deterioration that 
has or could have impact on functioning or HSE. 
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From these requirements, each operator builds an Annual Inspection Program that 
includes, on the average, 20% of the exposed assets to be covered (e.g. Structure, 
Cathodic Protection (CP) anodes, flowline and riser departures, etc). Each round of 
inspection is preceded by a complete GVI to identify the possible problem areas. With 
improved technology, excellent ROV video is sent to the asset owner for online selection 
and optimisation of areas for CVI (Close or detailed Visual Inspection). Some of the 
critical anodes and any suffering deterioration may be NDT-tested e.g. by magnetic 
particle detector techniques. See Table 2.2 for the typical inspection requirements 
(Bayliss et al., 1988).  
 
Table 2.2: Inspection Requirements for subsea assets (Bayliss et al, 1988).
Subsea wells Flowlines Riser Base Riser FPSO
Damage & Debris Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corrosion Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marine growth Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Condition of coatings Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Condition of anodes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Selected CP readings Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Electrical integrity of earthings No No No No No
Free spans No No Yes No No
Seabed position plot No No Yes No No
Fouling of seawater in /outlet No No No No Yes  
2.1.1 Benefits of Inspection 
There are at least three inspection benefits: quality assurance, compliance with regulation 
and defect management.  Most inspection results confirm that there are no defects and 
deterioration, and that the structure and underwater facility is still within operational 
limits. This confirmation provides assurance of the design criteria so that future designs 
can be done with increased confidence. This is very important in Offshore Technology 
because the industry is always hogging the frontier. The second benefit is the most 
obvious one. Retention of the platform certification is conditioned on a successful 
program of inspection. The management of defects is important for the retention of the 
asset integrity, maintenance of production availability and avoidance of HSE impact. 
This could also have reputation and legal dimension (Bayliss et al, 1988). 
 
2.2 WORK PERFORMANCE IS DYNAMIC AND COMPLEX 
Task complexity is defined by Sturman et al (2002) as a reflection of the degree of 
challenge workers face in its execution. This leads to the development of new skills and 
knowledge, which can then help solve future problems.  They argued that employees 
need exposure to complex tasks and services to provide them opportunity to exhibit 
initiative and grow. Complex services also make personalized solutions necessary, if not 
unavoidable; and forces “representatives to take initiative when tailoring their offers and 
responses to customer’s individual needs”. 
Sturman et al (2002) based their research theory on the Ackerman model of task 
performance. The theory had been supported by laboratory and industry studies. It is 
very intuitive. It holds that at first, the task performance is slow, painstaking and error-
prone.  But this improves as the skills relevant to the task are learnt and applied 
automatically, with much less thinking, so that performance improves.  With experience, 
performance follows a learning curve. However, this curve will be different for different 
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individuals as we have different “abilities, motivation and opportunities”. The dynamics 
in performance can be of two forms.  They could arise from changes in the people 
executing the tasks or providing the services e.g. through training or motivation. This is 
known as the Changing Subjects Model. They could also result from changes in the 
“determinants of performance” i.e. Changing Tasks Model. 
In this Masters Thesis, our focus is on the task-related factors that determine performance 
variability. This does not mean that motivation and knowledge are less important. We 
have taken the view that data on the task factors that might influence performance would 
be cheaper and easier to gather. The Project has an extensive record going back 9 years 
on such parameters as the job location, water depth, equipment performance, elements 
that influence task difficulty, procedures adopted, detailed job reports and so on. On the 
other hand, records of motivation and knowledge levels of staff are not that rigorously 
kept. Arguably, this could have been measured. It is true that the knowledge of crew 
would be important. The contract specifies a minimum experience, qualification and job 
category of the personnel that must be on the vessel (Offshore Manager, Senior Project 
Engineer and Project Engineer, etc), and these requirements are always complied with, 
sometimes even exceeded. Also the Client representatives are always on board the vessel. 
Then there are very capable specialists in the operation of the ROVs, Cranes and Module 
Handling Systems. Together, the operation crew of circa ten per shift have over 100 
years of experience as well as industry based certification. This was the case over the 
period of the study i.e. 2006 to 2008.  
Thus, it can be assumed that the only Subject Model variable of relevance would be the 
motivation level of the employees of the Project.  However, as earlier observed, this is 
not recorded. Projects are usually highly resulted-oriented (Gardiner, 2005). The author 
has witnessed several sessions of focused and dedicated application of knowledge and 
expertise in a team based environment. We have assumed in this Masters Thesis that 
motivation was not an issue (i.e. held adequate and constant). 
 
2.3 ORGANIZATIONAL AND JOB LEVEL COMPLEXITY 
Complexity can occur at all levels of on organisation and at their work processes. It can 
also be viewed at the level of jobs and tasks i.e. the difficulty involved in executing them. 
2.3.1 Organizational complexity and high-technology  firms 
Von Glinow and Mohrman (1990) proposed the following four intuitive identifiers for 
high technology firms: 
• Employs large proportion of scientist, engineers and technologists. 
• High percentage of research and development spend (twice the industry average). 
• Emergence of new technology renders old technology obsolete. 
• Potential for extremely rapid growth. 
People in these organisations are valued by their technical expertise which they must 
maintain up-to-date to remain relevant. Valuable expertise is derived from different 
disciplines and specialities. They are combined to solve complex, “ill-defined and 
elaborate” projects with “multiple puzzles” whose solutions must be mutually compatible 
in a workable system of tasks. In addition, the complex system of tasks and people exist 
in an environment that is constantly changing and therefore uncertain. 
The foregoing is a sound description of the study Project. Each IMR job or 
“maintenance project” is usually loosely defined. The Project must integrate a range of 
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in-house and external expertise to deliver the IMR service to the Client specifications and 
within the capabilities of the IMR; using own & hired equipment, and executing these 
safely, efficiently and effectively. 
2.3.2 Forms of job level complexity 
At the level of jobs and tasks, Complexity may be seen in terms of the difficulty of 
solving a problem – measured in time and in space i.e. memory requirements (Barringer, 
2008).  The approach adopted for the modelling of the associated complexity was 
inspired by literature such as these, own experience, reviews of previous job reports and 
interviews with Project Leaders. 
Richardson et al (2004) investigated the relevance of seven task variables to assembly 
operation complexity. The variables were hypothesized through task analyses and then 
studied using statistical multivariable analysis. From these, they proposed a prediction 
model for assembly complexity. It took the form of a model of complexity or the level of 
difficulty based on (a) the number of components; (b) the symmetrical planes; (c) novel 
assemblies; (d) the number of fastenings; and (e) the number of component groups. 
Together, these five valid variables had an R of 0.76 and R2 of 0.56. This implies that 
56% of the variations in the level of difficulty were explained by the modelled factors. 
DNV-RP-H101 (2002) “Risk management in marine and subsea operations” lists seven 
assessment parameters, including: 
• Marine operation method (novelty, feasibility, robustness, type, previous experience) 
• Personnel exposure (qualification, experience, required presence, shift arrangement) 
• Equipment used (margins robustness, condition maintenance, previous experience, 
suitability, experience with operators or contractors); 
• Operational aspects (language barriers, season environment conditions, local marine traffic, 
shore proximity); 
• Existing field infrastructure (surface and sub-surface); 
• Handled object (value, structural strength / robustness); 
• Overall project particulars (delay, replacement time / cost, repair possibilities, number 
of contractors’ interfaces, project development period). 
The last parameter is an outcome in the context of this Master Thesis. The penultimate 
two relate to the physical infrastructure and can also be ignored.  As discussed earlier, we 
decided to exclude personnel factors for pragmatic and practical data availability reasons. 
The remaining three parameters (marine, equipment and operational aspects) have 
important issues that were corroborated during interviews with the Project. These 
include novelty of the job, equipment condition, experience with the tool, and 
environmental conditions (or seastate which is often measured by significant wave 
height). 
The difficulty with physical complexity is that there are several possible formulations. 
Edmonds collated up to 40 different such formulations. Some of these are shown on 
Table 2.3. Many of them have wide applicability and can be extended to IMR subsea 
services.  
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Some Formulations of Complexity (Edmonds B., 1999)
Formulation Credit Definition Strengths & Limits
1 Abstract Computational 
Complexity
Blum, M. A.,1967 Set of decidable computation functions in time and 
space.
Influential. Too broad, sub functions 
maybe more complex.
2 Algorithmic Information 
Complexity
Solomonoff R.J., 1964; 
Kolmogorov A.N., 1965; 
Chaitin G.J., 1966
Length of shortest program to produce in a Turing 
machine. Ordering reduces complexity
Influential. Skewed towards 
Information theory
3 Arithmetic Complexity Girard, J.Y., 1987 Min. no of arithmetic operations required to complete a 
task
Practical & encourages  efficiency.
4 Cognitive Complexity Kelly, G.A., 1955 Dimensions of inferred mental mode in discuss of 
personal constructions
1D cognitive Simple, 2D more 
complex.
5 Connectivity various; e.g. Winograd 
S., 1963.
Level of interconnections between system components. Reliability, chemical rxns, 
competition networks, ecosystems 
etc.6 Cyclomatic Number various: e.g. Temperly 
H.N.V, 1981; Hops JM et 
al 1995.
No. of independent loops in a graph. n(G) = m - n + p, 
where m = # arcs, n # vertices, p # disjoint partitions the 
graph divides into
Captures interconnectedness. Army 
heirachy reduces complexity. 
Committee max. comms channels 
allows unpredictable to happen.
7 Descriptive/ 
Interpretative
Loofgen, L., 1974. Difficulty of encoding realisation (building blocks, e.g. 
DNA) into a descriptive whole and decoding back.
Uses Kolmogorov for  description & 
Logical depth for interpretation.
8 Dimension Attractor Baker, G.L., 1990. The extent a process can be modeled, its attractor in 
state space, forms a system of converging  dimensions
Fractal with chaotic processes.
9 Dimensions Lugosi G., Zeger K., 1996 The no. of irreducible or unique dimensions in a system 
guides its complexity
Applied to concept learning
10 Ease of Decomposition various: e.g. Conant 
R.C., 1972
Ease of decomposing the system into it sub-components Extensively applied.
11 Economic Complexity various, e.g. Arthur B., 
1994
Where some or economics simplifiying assumptions do 
not hold, complexity results.
Agent Theory is one example.
12 Entropy various e.g. Cornachio, 
J.V., 1977
The more disorder (entropy) a system has the more 
description information required and more complexity
Essentially probabilistic
13 Goodman's Complexity Goodman, N., 1966. Complexity of a system is the sum of the complexity of its 
predicates
14 Horn Complexity Aanderaa S.O. & Boorger 
E., 1979.
Min. length of a Horn formula that defines a function. Related to network complexity
15 Inequivalent Models Mikulecky D.C. 1995 Presence of multiple inequivalent models describing the 
same system.
16 Info. Gain in Heirarchical 
Approx. & Scaling
Grassberger, P., 1989. A system is complex if it reveals different laws 
(interactions) at different resolution levels.
Captures information increase with 
increasing scale.
17 Information Klir, G.J. 1984 Amount information  a system encodes or is required to 
describe it.
Deterministicall equiv to AIC and 
probabilistically eqiv. to Entropy
18 Irreducibility Nelson,R.J., 1976. That which is irreducible. like Decomposition
19 Logical Depth Bennett, C.H., 1988. Run time to generate object by incompressible program. 
Random & simple programs have least depths.
Long computation or slow to 
simulate dynamic process are deep 
logically.20 Organised and 
Disorganised Complexity
Weaver, W. 1948. Organised compl. occurs when a limited set of factors 
affect the whole. Disorganised complexity occurs with 
many ind. variables
Disorganised examples is accident 
statistics, organised include 
economic flucntuations
21 Size various: Carneilo, R.L. No. of parts increases potential for complexity Necessary but not  sufficient
22 Symbols Jaskowski, S. 1948 No. of sysmbols is a guide to complexity. Necessary but not  sufficient
23 Variables Diamond A.H. & 
Mckinsey J.C., 1947
The no. of variables and its structure affects complexity. Necessary but not  sufficient
24 Variety various: Bak P. & 
Paczuski M., 1995
Likely to exhibit greater variety in behaviour Easily counted (types, sudden 
changes etc)  
 
For instance, the job of providing IMR service has a high degree of abstraction although 
the ROV-held cameras help to provide some context. Also, there are several dimensions 
to it, including marine operations, structure deployment analyses, material science, 
weather and hydrodynamics, maintenance engineering, etc. Jobs come in different levels 
of difficulty and thus require different levels of procedure steps to analyse and describe. 
The task plans of the most difficult jobs have several elaborate pictures to assist their 
visualisation, and others have no pictures whatsoever (there are no animations). This is 
akin to symbol formulation of complexity. In addition, the most complex jobs are 
broken into a series of standardised sub-tasks to increase their ordering and thus reduce 
complexity.  
According to Goodman's formulation of complexity, a system’s complexity is related to 
the sum of the complexity of its parts. We know that the hydrodynamic response of 
irregularly shaped objects in water, The North Sea weather and ROV flight pattern (to 
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name only three) all require multiple variables for their description. Thus, each of these is 
potentially complex in theory. In reality, they are very much so. Each is a specialist 
discipline on its own. As IMR operations include or involve them, it can be inferred from 
Goodman's formulation of complexity that IMR services are complex.  
Predicting the performance of such a complex operation will require multiple variables. One 
of the most frustrating properties of complex systems is that they are difficult to 
decompose (Edmonds, 1999). It could take a dozen variables to describe weather alone. 
For simplicity and convenience, the industry adopts significant wave height and wave 
length as key operability measures. Richardson’s works on task complexity is consistent 
with this simplification. We can not measure everything and remain efficient. In any case, 
the redundancy in the range of possible measures encourages us to limit the variables as 
much as possible. 
Other measures considered for representing complexity include: (a) number of pictures 
in the procedure; (b) number of procedure steps; and (c) number of hold-points. The last 
measure is so important that sometimes independent witnessing is required (DNV, June 
2004). Hold-points are “points in the procedure beyond which operation must not 
progress unless and until the authority is given by a specified person or organisation”. It 
is less common (or evident) in valve operations, and more common in module handling 
(MH) and light construction (LC) job types. In addition, this could be a good measure 
because it captures the number of intermediate outcomes that could influence how the 
job might progress, an indication of dis-organised complexity. 
There tends to be more pictures in the more complex jobs. However, the number of 
pictures can increase because equipment is hired in, and not necessarily because the job is 
more difficult. Some job steps that are executed by OEM (e.g. module running tool 
operation) are not clearly described in the procedures. The number of procedure steps 
would have been problematic for this reason. 
2.3.3 Uncertainty in jobs 
Through interviews and reviews of job reports, it became clear that, in addition 
complexity, another measurable reason why a job might be delayed is its inherent 
uncertainty. Whereas complexity relates to the difficulty or challenge the job requires, the 
uncertainty refers to our inability to completely specify a subsea intervention activity 
beforehand. This is not always a bad thing. Sometimes a job being executed correctly and 
on schedule is interrupted on the request of the Client in order to attend to a higher 
priority job. On returning to the original job to complete the remaining tasks, often the 
Project found that the level of efficiency achieved before the interruption was not 
immediately attained. Also, certain set-up and placement tasks for ROV and tooling have 
to be repeated. In essence, extra time would be required. We have decided to call this 
type of uncertainty Phasing. It is similar to setup losses that the Overall Equipment 
Effectives (OEE) measures seek to minimize in order to increase equipment availability 
(Liyanage, 2007, Sharma et al 2002+). Phasing is assessed from the completed job 
reports 
Another uncertainty measure is Scope Change. Changes in job scope can occur on 
occasions when the some of the assumptions held about the job during its planning 
phase are found to be incomplete or incorrect on site. Access to the critical modules may 
be restricted and needs to be improved or created. The tool may not match even if the 
correct type had been selected. It would need to be modified quickly and effectively. All 
of these would take time which could lead to slippages. Scope changes are also assessed 
from completed job reports. 
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Finally, a third aspect of uncertainty is the Management of Change (MOC). This is the 
controlled process of adjusting the prescribed procedure for executing a job. The need 
for this could arise if the Senior Project Engineer finds that this original procedure can 
not be adopted due to miss-match, access, unavailability of tools and equipment, or for 
some other reason. The MOC is documented according to the Project Guidelines. It is 
suitably approved and included in the Offshore Report. The complete MOC records are 
kept on the vessel so it was more efficient to access this information directly. 
The distinction between MOC and Scope Change is subtle. Scope Change is normally 
requested by the Client, whereas MOC is a control process implemented by Project over 
a change considered risky or significant. The most common form of SC is when an 
agreed and ongoing sequence of work is interrupted and a new stream of activities 
executed before the original stream is resumed at the original point of interruption. If all 
these activities are low risk or generic (e.g. inspection, anchor assistance and valve 
operation) a well developed task plan and HIRA could be enough to control the change 
process. Sometimes, the Client requires not only the addition of new activities, but also a 
complete change in the sequence of existing activities. MOC process is always done these 
types of changes, as a control. The same event could lead to both MOC and Scope 
Change. Some only cause a Scope Change.  
 
2.4 SERVICE INNOVATION IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY FIRMS 
As noted in section 2.3.1, IMR processes are inherently innovative because of the unique 
service contents delivered in each job. Now, service innovation is generally more demanding 
than product innovation. The former also involves changes in the delivery process, interface, 
relationships and performance (Gerbauer et al, 2008). The history of innovation models 
(Table 2.4) reflects these increasing linkages and the increasingly more complex contexts 
in which service innovation must occur. An example of such a collaborative environment 
is depicted in Figure 2.1. It features a production facility which is the focus and 
beneficiary of applied resources from the operator and a range of service providers 
(Panesar & Markeset, 2007). This is not unlike what happens in IMR service delivery. 
The degree of innovativeness may be described as (a) Radical, i.e. new to the world; (b) 
“Me Too”; or (c) Incremental.  Companies that have formal service innovation processes 
are more likely to have successful innovations (Oke, 2007).   
Table 2.4:   Innovation Models  (summarised from Panesar and Markeset, 2008)
Year Generation Theme Strengths
1950s First Linear Sequential model Technology driven
1960s Second Market Pull model Market driven
1970s? Third Coupling model Market, technology & scientic progress feedbacks.
1980s Fourth Integrative model Cross-functional integration across disciplines & companies
1990s Fifth Strategic linkages Strategic links with suppliers/ Customers, employees and speed  
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Fig 2.1: Service Collaboration for Production Facility
(taken from Kumar and Markeset, 2007)
 
 
Authors agree that the initiation or idea generation stage is the first-step of all 
innovations (Gebuar et al, 2008; Panesar and Markeset, 2007; Oke, 2007). This proposes 
a method to improve the customer offering or the processes for delivering them. It can 
be internally or externally driven, or even from a special R&D department. Each of these 
ideas is then evaluated against the organisation’s decision making factors, and the best 
ones are selected for implementation. Decision making factors include: (a) return on 
investments, (b) availability of raw materials, (c) innovation costs, risk of failure (d) 
availability of external competence (Panesar & Markeset, 2007).  
Even when the work context (Figure 2.1) emphasises resource flow, there are technology 
(new technical requirements), market (customer or facility needs) and integrative pulls in 
the process which can all encourage innovation. The cross-functional teams provide 
ongoing input and feedback. These “pulls” was observed in IMR study Project. Each 
specific requirement is discussed widely by experts until the most optimal solutions are 
short-listed. There are several levels of interaction (management, project manager level, 
technical manager, Project Engineers and Offshore between Project and Client reps). 
Formal multi-discipline meetings are also held to review the solutions options, risks and 
schedules.  
In another paper, Parnesar and Markeset (2007) propose an alternate taxonomy including 
operational needs, return on investment, market position, contractual relationships, 
service gaps, service relationships and organizational environment. These are very 
relevant to a competitive situation. Perceived gaps in product market position can be a 
strong incentive to invest in innovation, irrespective of the risks or investment required. 
For instance, in 2007 the IMR Project vessel was taken to dry dock in the middle of the 
contract. The resulting upgrade raised the vessel’s weather tolerability for ROV 
operations to 5m (among other things). This had become the Industry standard from the 
new contracts awarded in that year. Thus this was a “me-too” investment in innovation 
(higher ROV operability) necessary to remain competitive in their target market.  
In most cases however, each job aims at delivering pre-agreed results on an existing 
installation. If innovative solutions are proposed they are reviewed and integrated. Right 
up to job execution, the Project has procedures for considering and approving changes 
to task plans (e.g. Management of Change). Sometimes, the Project is specifically 
required to develop a feasible solution for an innovative or a very new job. 
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2.4.1 Factors influencing service innovation 
Panesar and Markeset (2007) validated five key drivers of innovation in the Oil & Gas 
Industry of Norway. Others include (a) customer initiatives and feedback; (b) new or 
improved technology; (c) employee initiatives & feedback;   (d) Government regulation; 
and (e) lateral learning from similar services. 
Their surveys and analyses show that market needs and customer feedback are the most 
important drivers of innovation. Service providers such as Aker Solutions, Acergy and 
Seadrill collaborate with Operators such as StatoilHydro, BP and ConocoPhillips to 
develop new solutions, which can improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency of 
their business processes. The other factors are no less important. Firstly, they tend to 
drive market needs & Client feedback. Secondly, regulation can be very prescriptive (e.g. 
CO2 sequestering).  
In another study of Contractual Relationships’ influence on innovation, the same authors 
concluded that “the development of appropriate contracts is essential to creating an 
environment for service innovations and continuous improvements”. Gerbauer et al 
(2008) and Oke (2007) found that healthy (i.e. creative and open) internal organisations 
foster more fruitful innovations. These can be demonstrated by a clear strategy and the 
level of resource provided.  
IMR jobs are inherently innovative. New underwater barriers are constantly being 
broken. New tools and procedures are frequently introduced. Some jobs are generic (see 
Figure 2.2) i.e. recurring quite frequently, but most jobs have several sets of an 
appropriately modified “solution” that serves the current requirement. Solutions are 
defined as: “A defined group of components (equipment, tools, procedures and services) 
which when integrated together will resolve a customer’s complex problem” (adapted 
from Shepherd & Ahmed, 2000). 
 
2.5 MAINTENANCE PROJECT PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
Each IMR job is organised as a maintenance project (for a discussion see Coetzee, 1997). 
It has a unique goal e.g. “Replace SCM at Troll BCD”, it is temporary and resources are 
assigned to it for these specific tasks (Gardiner, 2005). Depending on the job type, the 
Project may hire in other resources from third parties at agreed rates.  
 
 
Thus, 3 groups of resources are mobilised for the project execution: Project (the 
provider of Ship), Client (owner of facility) and Hired- in Resources (third parties, 
including OEMs). The Client maintains a rolling schedule of the jobs. These are updated 
each week (duration, sequence of  execution, and, occasionally, objectives). As the Ship 
and each of the resources are charged per unit time, the planned and actual schedule 
drives budgeted cost and actual cost performance, respectively.  
In addition, a large proportion of these jobs have hydrocarbon tied to them. Thus, the 
speed at which the services are delivered also influences the Client’s  revenue. This is an 
incentive to progress jobs quickly through the planning phase to Offshore for execution 
(see IMR Work Process Figure 2.2).  
This is almost always possible for routine jobs like Valve Operations and Condition 
Monitoring. To a lesser degree, jobs with standardised solutions like Module Handling 
can also be planned fairly quickly. However, some jobs are so unique and / or complex 
Fig 2.2:  IMR Work Process
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that sufficient time is required for the development of unique solutions for them. For 
instance, the planning phase of tie-in and light Construction projects could take months, 
as unique tools and solutions need to be developed. They are also more likely to require 
more vessel time for execution.  
2.5.1 IMR contract forms and structure 
There are two common forms of major contracts in the Norwegian Industry: 
Maintenance and Modifications (M&M) and Performance Based Operation (PBO). 
M&M contracts pay a fixed sum for a fixed scope of work that is defined by the service 
receiver.  In PBO contracts, some portions of the payments depend on the service 
performance. The scope of work is flexible: the possible options, changes and variations 
are specified by the Client. Actual payments are linked to the quantity and quality of 
service delivered (Kumar & Markeset, 2007). Thus, there is a profit incentive for the 
service provider to deliver high quality services from the start.  
IMR contract is a mixture of both of these types. There is a fixed day rate for the vessel 
and for each of the items on board. However, the actual delivery schedule is not fixed. If 
the job takes a little longer than planned due to increased difficulty or “scope creep,” the 
extra scope is executed and the Project is compensated. If there are weather delays the 
Project receives a lower day rate. Lost time due to equipment breakdown is charged at 
progressively lower rates, depending on degree of operability. Thus, there are sufficient 
incentives for the Project to specify very high reliability for the equipment used.  
However, the incentive for efficiency is less clear-cut. There is at least one Client Rep 
aboard the vessel at all times. The Client manages the schedule and determines its 
priorities. The Client also approves and supervises the job procedure. There are several 
hold-points where the Client checks and approves progress. One can thus conclude that 
the Client is partly responsible for efficiency in the short-term. In the longer term, the 
Client is in the position to review the numbers of jobs executed with her annual budget, 
and obtain an idea of the overall efficiency of service delivery. It is likely that the Client 
would embark on this sort of review during contracts renewals and extensions. Thus 
efficiency is important in the longer term.  
Kumar and Markeset (2007) identify five types of maintenance contracts as shown on 
Table 2.5. IMR services for subsea assets can be described as Type 3 i.e. Product + Total 
Service. The Operators buys in all the routine and non-routine maintenance (including 
repairs) that is required to retain the reliability and availability of the subsea assets. 
 
Table 2.5: Types of maintenance contracts (Adapted from Kumar, R., Markeset, T. and Kumar, U. 2004)
Types Owner Process Perf Routine 
Maintenance
Specialised 
Maintenance
Spares / 
Tools
Remarks
Pr
od
uc
t
1 Traditional Opco Opco Opco OEM OEM
2 Product + 
maintenance bundle
Opco Opco Opco or OEM OEM OEM
3 Product + total 
service
Opco Opco & OEM OEM OEM OEM Availability & 
reliability only
So
lu
tio
ns
4 Solutions selling Opco Opco & OEM OEM OEM OEM Sells performance 
and function 
5 Total care OEM OEM OEM OEM OEM Helps Opco realise 
vision  
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2.5.2 Measures for project performance 
The reasons for performance measurement and management are to “check position”, 
“communicate position”, “confirm priorities” and “compel progress” (Amarantunga, 
2002). In addition to the scale and scope economies that defined the industrial age, 
companies are developing intangible assets. These include developing customer 
relationship and knowledge workers, the introduction of innovative products, and 
deployment of IT. To enhance capture over the longer-term and harder-to-measure 
competitive measures, models such as (a) Balanced Scorecard (BSC), (b) EFQM and (c) 
Scandia Navigator have evolved.  Each model measures results and its enablers, over the 
long-term and against the company strategy. They all recommend the development of 
people and relationships to drive innovation. However, only EFQM is inherently 
scaleable (applicable to businesses of all sizes). Just like BSC perspectives, Scandia’s 
mission statement is difficult to define for business groups or away from the very top of 
the firm. EFQM and Scandia have much better coverage over intellectual capital and 
stakeholders than BSC (Liyanage, 2008; Marr and Adams, 2007; Neely et al, 2000; 
Uyiomendo, 2008 unpublished).  
Thus, EFQM kind of model could be used for the performance management of IMR 
projects. This is a nine criteria model that was jointly developed by European industry in 
1988. The first five criteria are enabling i.e. describing how organisations should 
undertake her activities; the last four criteria describe the actual results. Excellence in 
performance, customers, people and society are achieved through leadership driving policy and 
strategy that is delivered through people, partnerships and resources / processes. It is the only 
model that requires a self-assessment. 
However, experts consider this scaleable model even too top-level and extensive for 
project performance management (it is also considered too extensive for this Masters 
Thesis). Projects are temporary, the products are different each time and the concept of 
customer is dispersed and changing (e.g. see Gardiner, 2005). To choose an appropriate 
measure of project performance, the author considered both the literature and the data 
availability. A very good measure may be impractical because the retrospective data may 
not allow its computation (Waal et al, 2007). After a review of literature and practice 
(DOE, USA), the committee setup by DOE proposed a comprehensive list shown in 
Figure 2.4. 
Figure 2.4: Project Management Measures (USA DOE National Reasearch Council
Project-Level 
Output/Outcome 
Program- and Department-Level 
Input/Process Measure
Program- and Department-Level 
Output/Outcome Measure
1 Cost growth Project director staffing. Assess project perf. (Green / Yellow/ 
Red).
2 Schedule growth Project support staffing. Time projects remain  yellow or red.
3 Phase cost factors Senior Management involvement. Mission effectiveness.
4 Phase schedule 
factors 
Commitment to project Green 0.90 to 1.15
5 Preliminary 
engineering and 
Identification and use of lessons 
learned.
Yellow 0.85- 0.90 or 1.15 - 1.25
6 Cost variance Independent  reviews & impl of  
actions.
Red  <0.85 or >1.25
7 Cost performance Number and dollar value of 
8 Schedule variance Project performance wrt project 
size & contract type.
9 Schedule Use of good project management 
10 Safety performance  
The singular most appropriate measure is the schedule variance. A measure for this is 
Schedule Performance Index (SPI) (budgeted cost of work performed/actual cost of 
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work performed). As shown, the Research Council proposed a double-sided grading 
system for Green (90 - 115%), Yellow (85 – 90% or 115 – 125%) and Red (<85% or 
>125%). Simplified and applied to the case of IMR, SPI is equivalent to the planned 
duration/actual duration. This is so because each item on board the vessel has a fixed 
hourly rate once mobilised and operational.  
David Malloy observed that SPI is a lagging measure that is often weeks and months old 
when computed. In addition, it is likely to be optimistic (as it may not capture reworks 
and errors). It is also difficult to use as a management lever as it reflects “only known 
past, problems”. This is a very harsh criticism. In the case of IMR the execution duration 
includes rework and error correction time, so the calculated SPI is representative. Similar 
jobs are repeated at different sites. Thus, learning points can be carried to subsequent 
jobs in terms of adjustments to schedules, tools or procedures. If a pattern exists in a set 
of projects reviewed, it may point to systematic issues that could be resolved proactively 
for subsequent campaigns.  
Gardiner P.D. (2005) demonstrates how SPI can be used for management reviews. The 
context was projects of several months and years of duration. The projects undertaken 
by IMR have durations of days and weeks. In this case, the learning points from reviews 
would be more useful for future projects in the short-term (in addition to management 
reviews). This is the case in our retrospective study. Given the data available, this 
measure is arguably the most appropriate. 
Thus, SPI will be used as the dependent variable in our investigation. The aim of this 
research then reduces to determining the independent variables that influence SPI. 
 
2.6 ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
The environmental factors which can influence operations in The North Sea include 
waves, current, wind (speed and direction), ice and snow fall, air temperature, sea 
temperature (Gudmestand, 2008; Norsok N-003, 2007). Given the common operational 
areas of the vessel, wave height and wave period are the most important measures of 
operability (Hovland, 2007). See also section 1.3. When the weather is not favourable the 
operation “waits on weather”. This contributes to delays. 
Another environmental element that will be modelled is water depth. The Project IMR 
vessel was commonly deployed to intervene in subsea production systems installed at 
between 70m to 1100m. The shallower the operating water depth, the shorter the time 
that may be required. Although less obvious, the lesser, too, would be the potential for 
delays because of the reduced running in period. 
 
2.7 MAPPING OF INFLUENCE FACTORS AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
HYPOTHESES 
Based on the foregoing literature survey, a number of hypotheses are hereunder 
developed for testing. These relate to water depth, weather, complexity and job 
uncertainty. They are enumerated below. 
2.7.1 Influence of water depth on operations 
A number of tools are used in sequence during IMR operations. Many of these are 
carried to sea bottom on the tool basket. However, a significant proportion of the tools 
require tripping to the surface for selection, installation and configuration. These include 
complex tools, tools requiring calibration to ROV and valves before use, and heavy tools. 
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For these cases, setup and tool changes would take more time in deeper operating 
conditions are. In addition, the effects of water pressure and the associated resistance 
increase with water depth. Longer ROV umbilical and winch crane wires are required for 
deeper waters, and the risks of entanglement increases with depth (requires slower ROV 
sailing or “flying” speed). In addition, direction of current varies as depth increases. 
Wave interaction with sea bottom reduces visibility, which could potentially slow 
operations down. The effect of this is strong down to half the wave length. Strong water 
currents could also constrain operations by causing guide wire “blow” (although this also 
depends on the location). Another important effect of working in deeper waters relates 
to breakdowns (discussed below). Repairs of equipment in deep waters would require 
more time just to retrieve it to the surface. 
One could argue that IMR equipment has been designed for 1500m, and so should not 
be constrained at all operations within these depths. In addition, the use of techniques 
such “Constant Tension” should limit GW blow. The “design” argument is also a 
possible counter for visibility (ROVs have at least six very powerful underwater lights) 
and water pressure (there are six or seven power thrusters for movement in all 
directions). It is true that specification of high reliability equipment avoids breakdowns. 
But equipment breakdowns do occur, and when they do, there is no short-cut method to 
retrieve them to the surface for repairs. 
H1: Does SPI increase with an increase in water depth?  
2.7.2 Influence of weather disruption  
Some IMR operations are highly sensitive to weather (weather limitation of circa 3m Hs). 
In this group includes Module Handling and Light Intervention. Valve Operations and 
Condition Monitoring can be executed at Hs of circa 5m. The Project has access to 
online weather forecasts which are reliable. However, these are not infallible. Once an 
operation is planned, the least weather tolerant item can stall it. The project copes with 
this by breaking the job into portions with different weather tolerability. The sub-tasks 
could then be phased but their sequence must be in an acceptable order. Different jobs 
(VO, CMM and MH etc) with differing tolerability would allow flexibility to select jobs 
more appropriate to the weather forecast, provided there is no fixed succession 
relationships prescribed by the Client.   
Even within the weather tolerability limit, equipment lifts and transfers; personnel 
movement, motivation and sharpness could all dip in a terrible weather. The Offshore 
team is empowered to cease operations when it is considered unsafe to continue. The 
Project treasures her very impressive safety performance. 
H2: Does SPI increase as weather becomes less favourable?   
2.7.3 Influence of equipment availability 
Besides weather, another possible operational disruption is equipment breakdown. The 
vessel runs a very tight operation and with very little sparing. For now, the vessel and 
crane can be assumed to have 100% reliability. Nothing works without the vessel and the 
more complex operations require the crane. In this Thesis, reliability discussions are 
centred on the ROVs. The Project ROV reliability reports show 97% average 
performance for both hired and owned ROVs. Now Condition Monitoring and Valve 
Operations can be done with a single ROV (with some stretch, either ROV if the 
required torque is low). Both ROVs are required simultaneously for MH and LC jobs. So 
a failure in any one would delay these more complex jobs. Thus CM and VO could be 
disrupted or interrupted by simultaneous failures on the two ROVs i.e. (1 – 0.032) = 
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99.91%.  MH and LC requires at least one failure i.e. both must be working = 
0.972=94.09% (See Aven, 1991) 
The running tools and MHS have even more specific roles. Spares and competence for 
repairs are retained on the vessel but down time causes loss of revenue for both Client 
and Project. Potentially, each breakdown could cause delays whose duration depends on 
how quickly repairs can be carried out. If we assume spares and competence are always 
available, this is a function of working conditions i.e. weather, as the vessel is a 24hour 
work place. A breakdown during a precious weather window could cause a longer delay 
i.e. the “butterfly effect”.  
Hired-in equipment deserves a special mention. These are used for peak shaving and the 
more specialised jobs.  Hired-in ROV reliability performance and expectation is high 
(4.5%) but not quite as high at the 2-3% set for Project owned ROVs. At least in one 
case, work was delayed after a failure on a hired-in ROV because the spare could only be 
located in another country. As a significant proportion of equipment is hired-in this risk 
is considerable. Overall, the breakdown records for ROVs are very good.  
A less obvious issue relates to MH jobs executed with some degree of urgency. These 
require a ready OEM running tool plus a new module for replacement. Modular 
replacement policy can limit deferment from the well through rapid response. The 
readiness of such Client Provided Items (CPI) can delay "rapid response" jobs.  
H3: Does SPI increase with increasing equipment unavailability?  
2.7.4 Influence of job complexity 
Complexity relates to degree of difficulty (in time or space) required to do things. The 
more complex an activity is, the higher the potential for errors, rework and hence delays 
in specified time (Barringer, 2008). As discussed in section 2.3.2, we can recognise 
complex jobs from their lengthy procedures, elaborate pictures, new or exotic tools, very 
heavy lifts and prescribed vessel interactions, etc. The more novel a tool or procedure is, 
the longer the time that is required to learn and perfect it. The less perfectly an operation 
is understood, the more prone it would be to surprises and errors. Thus, we expect usage 
of novel tools to potentially lead to more delays, when compared to generic tools. In 
practice, such new tools are subjected to FAT (factory acceptance test) and trial runs at 
the workshops. These simulate operational conditions for the Project Engineers. 
In the same vein, the most difficult lifts are potentially slower to execute and prone to 
more disruptions. It is not unusual for these awkward and heavy lifts to have deployment 
analyses specifying very narrow windows (in terms of wave height, water currents and 
wind speeds) for the operation. These require precision, a lucky gift from nature and lots 
of patience. They could also create potential for delays.  
A less obvious dimension for complexity is the number of contractor interfaces. This 
often correlates with the different types of OEM tools on board the vessel. A clear 
communication protocol is laid down for managing these interfaces. In addition, the 
procedure for the most complex jobs has “hold-points” prescribed to confirm and 
record conditions before the job continues.  
H4: Does SPI increase with an increase in job complexity?  
2.7.5 Influence of job uncertainty 
Each job starts and closes with a site survey. Even then, site assumptions can be quite 
different from reality on arrival. This could be due to, say, the activities of third parties, 
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incorrect labelling or an active sea bed. Before the job can proceed, the procedure would 
have to be amended in some way. This is a different kind of disruption.  
Even when all is well, the Client priorities could change. The work scope can change 
with new information. Extra time would then be required to propose, analyse and 
approve changes. The job procedures usually specify precautionary tests on guide wires 
and protective covers (and other exposed items) to reveal any weakness(s) under safer 
conditions. Should any be revealed, they must be corrected before work can progress. It 
is difficult to allow time for these on the schedule because one does not know if any or 
how much would be required.  
Some procedures do have contingency built in. These are clear steps that maybe required 
as a course of action should something else occur. These alternative steps that could 
lengthen or shorten the average duration. The scheduled time would be based on the 
base procedure (and not the contingency).  
H5: Does SPI increase with increase in job uncertainty?  
2.7.6 Influence of complexity mix 
Here we want to investigate if the availability of jobs with different levels of weather 
sensitivity would facilitate optimisation of vessel time, reduction of disruption and 
improvement of efficiency. In theory, this should be the case as between 3m and 5m Hs,, 
Valve Operations and Condition Monitoring type jobs can be executed. Such simple, 
short duration jobs are easier to fit into a narrow weather window.  However, the tool 
requirements for these jobs are different and sourced differently. Once a running tool is 
picked from an OEM it has to be paid for. And these running tools are very job and 
template specific. Thus vessel time might be saved, but OEM equipment & personnel 
time might still be incurred. In addition, wells with production shutdown could loose 
huge revenues. The lack of standardisation in modules and running tools exacerbates 
this. 
The overall schedule does show a mixed flow of job types. It is unclear the extent that 
this is accidental and the extent that it is intended. What is clear is that as the Client owns 
the schedule, the Project has only an advisory influence. 
H6: Does SPI depend on job complexity mix?  
2.7.7 Is the Project getting more innovative 
This hypothesis must be considered in relative terms over time. As noted earlier, 
innovativeness can be radical, “me-too” or incremental. In this case, we are more 
interested in whether there is more innovation now than in the past. The subsea industry 
has witnessed substantial technology-based innovation. The industry is always pushing 
depth & completion boundaries for subsea installations, especially in the North Sea. In 
IMR service in particular, there is a general drive for the improved procedures and safe 
practices, which can extends weight, weather and equipment limits. Given the above, is 
the Project in tune with these developments? Could it be ahead of the game?  
We know that that since 2007 it has focused on maintenance and repair job types. Each 
of these is potentially complex and provides an opportunity to innovate. The Project has 
the critical mass of engineering skills and total knowledge to innovate across the technical 
interfaces required for IMR. The meetings and team style encourage this. Project 
leadership recognise that, with increasing competition, both innovation and efficiency 
may be required to retain market share.  
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On the other hand, a ten year contract with fixed hourly terms provides very little 
incentive for innovation in an inflationary market. The options in the contract did 
encourage some vessel upgrade but they were of the “me-too” type. The cautious culture 
of preferring only tried and tested solutions with minimal extensions also serves to 
control the pace of innovations. The wide range of mutually compatible tools, methods 
and equipment could not have been very helpful. 
H7: Is Project getting more Innovative? 
2.7.8 Is the Project getting more efficient? 
Cost is never the only issue but it is hardly a non-issue. The Client budget has ceilings so 
if jobs are not efficient, the number of jobs executed falls off, and revenue from oil 
receipts could drop (depending on the extent to which oil-sensitive jobs can be 
prioritised). The culture of applying learning from previous jobs aids innovation as well 
as efficiency. The Project Engineers and Client Engineers will review the procedures for 
effectiveness first but also for efficiency. This continues offshore. It is not unlikely that 
top level reviews are conducted between Project and Client to see if there are 
opportunities for efficiency gains. The fact that the Client owns the schedule means 
changes to it could potentially be less responsive than desired in certain situations. It can 
be argued that as the project executes deeper water projects (e.g. Barents Sea) efficiency 
could fall off with increasing water depth. By a similar argument, older facilities, more 
complex tooling and field-life extensions could potentially impact on efficiency. 
H8: Is the Project getting more efficient?  
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3. MODELLING AND PREDICTION 
In this chapter, we will review the tools and techniques that will be used for modelling 
and analyses. Included are multi-variable regression and Bayesian inference. 
3.1 MULTI-VARIABLE REGRESSION ANALYSES 
Events of all types (medical, political, social, dynamic etc) have multiple causes or risk 
factors. Multivariable Analysis (MVA) is a statistical tool for determining the relative 
contributions of different causes to a single event or outcome.   For example, a MVA on 
disease prognosis might consider factors such as the pathogen(s), strain virulence, 
exposure route, exposure intensity and immune response. For example, risk factors 
associated with premature mortality includes notably smoking, a sedentary lifestyle, obesity, 
elevated cholesterol, and hypertension (Katz, 2006).  
Such a relationship could be described as linear combination of factors in the form 
ii XbXbXbXbXbaY ++++++= .......44332211      3.1 
 
Y is the value of the dependent variable, what is being predicted or explained. The 
constant "a" is the intercept, and bi are the slope (beta coefficients) for Xi, etc. 
In longitudinal data analysis, the important aspects of several subjects are measured 
repeatedly over a period of time. In cross-sectional studies a single aspect is tracked for a 
given subject. The former is more powerful because it allows changes with time and 
differences across people to be separated. It can detect changes within the same subject 
or individual over time (known as ageing effects), and distinguish these from baseline 
differences across the subjects (Diggle et al, 1996). 
Taris (2000) distinguished between mere association (termed co-variation) and causal 
links between variables. Relationships of associations can only support conclusions of the 
type “if X is the case, Y is usually the case as well” and “members of group a have on 
average more of the property X than members of group B”. Correlation coefficient 
(ordinal) or chi/square (qualitative) value would indicate the degree of association (Taris, 
2000). Statistics can only prove association and not cause (Katz, 2006). Causal 
relationships allow one to reach conclusions such as “Y is affected by X” which is more 
powerful for the understanding of the phenomenon and prediction of future changes. 
Three criteria need to be satisfied for causality to be assumed: 
a) Co-variation: there must be statistically significant association between the two 
variables of interest (co-variation);  
b) Non-spuriousness: the association must not be due to effect of other variables i.e. by 
ruling out alternative explanations and  
c) Temporal order: the “causal” variable must precede the “effect” variable. (Taris, 
2000).  
 
3.1.1 Regression analysis assumptions  
The assumptions of linear regression analysis include the following (Brace et al, 2006; 
Brown, 2004; Miles, 2001): 
• The sample must be representative of the population. 
• The independent variables are error-free.  
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• The independent variables must be linearly independent, i.e. it must not be 
possible to express any independent variable as a linear combination of the 
others. 
• The errors are uncorrelated, and the variance of the error is constant across 
observations.  
Our aim is to conduct a multivariable analysis on a set of existing data about IMR jobs 
executed between 2006 and 2008. For each job category, we have between 30 and 60 
jobs (206 in total). Only the set of jobs for which we have complete data was included. 
All these jobs would be analysed to determine the regression coefficients.  
We assume that the jobs that were excluded (i.e. for which there is no detailed Offshore 
Report) are random i.e. these cut across job types. In reality most of them are annual 
inspections. In any case, these jobs are executed by the same vessel using what is 
effectively a near constant “tool box”. The crew may change but the crew competence is 
constantly at, or above, the level required for the job undertaken. We assume that each 
job is sufficiently planned and the organizational knowledge available for the Project is 
brought to bear before and during execution.  In effect, we hold the organisational 
complexity constant and assume that schedule variance depends only on task complexity. 
This is a huge assumption. 
Taris (2000) explored the range of possible errors possible in retrospective study. 
Included are memory errors and reporting errors. By providing appropriate cues in the 
assessment templates, memory errors can be minimised. The extremely detailed reporting 
system available also aids the error-free recall of the details of the job execution. Jobs 
with insufficient detail were excluded from the analyses for this reason. Reporting errors 
are generic to all forms of research. The use of several levels of reviews should limit 
these to a negligible level. 
3.1.2 Reviewing multivariable analyses results 
Three key results from MVA that are often used to check the quality of the MVA output 
are as follows (Miles, 2001; Brown, 2004). 
• R2 value of the entire analyses: this indicates the proportion of the variations of 
the independent variable explained by variations in the dependent variable. This 
value can vary between 0 and 1. The adjusted R2 value relates this to the number 
of variable used. 
• Standard error of the estimate (SEE) is a representation of the standard deviation 
of dependent values around the regression line. 
• P-value of the coefficients: these have to be below 0.05. Any that is not is 
regarded as not significant. 
• Standardised coefficients are used to rank the relative influence of the factors.  
Miles (2001) provides a clear and pictorial description on how to conduct MVA with MS 
Excel. The process mirrors the reality including the MS Excel dialogue boxes quite well.  
Unlike professional statistical packages such as SPSS, MS Excel has some MVA 
limitations (Miles, 2001):   
• No standardised coefficients.  These are required to rank the raw coefficients.   
• Limited range of diagnostic graphs e.g. the normality plot of the residuals. 
• Lack of diagnostic statistics e.g. no co-linearity diagnostics. 
• Limited of features.  There is no hierarchical regression, no weighting cases, etc,  
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• Inflexibility: running a slightly different analysis must be done manually. 
Although the author could have accessed SPSS through the Project or University of 
Stavanger, MS Excel was far more readily available. Only the first, third and last of these 
short-comings were applicable to this particular study. Standardised errors would be 
treated as described http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standardized_coefficient. Before the 
analysis run, each variable (all X and Y) is standardized by subtracting their mean and 
dividing by their standard deviation. Then the resulting MVA beta coefficients indicate 
the relative influence of the predictor variables directly. Co-linearity checks and scenario 
changes were carried out separately. 
 
3.2 BAYESIAN INFERENCE FOR WEATHER OPERABILITY 
Historical data on favourable weather probabilities are shown in Figure 3.1 for different 
North Sea regions and months of the year. They were reported by Hovland. Bayesian 
inference can be used to update the original average probability of a 24hour weather 
window (in the month and location of interest), with recent weather evidence on an 
ongoing basis. As we get nearer to the job execution date, degree of assurance that there 
would be an appropriate weather for the job would improve. With enough evidence, a 
sharper decision can be reached to progress the job or defer. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_inference.  
SNS 3m Hs NNS 3m Hs SNS/NNS/NS 5m Hs
Jan 48 38 62
Feb 55 42 65
Mar 62 50 78
Apr 85 68 87
May 97 87 93
Jun 98 89 99
Jul 98 92 99
Aug 92 90 95
Sep 84 70 90
Oct 77 50 85
Nov 72 44 75
Dec 50 37 68
average 76.5 63.1 83.0
SNS = South South Sea NNS = North North Sea NS = North Sea
Figure 3.1: Available time in a month (operability) that can be used for a 24hour operation with 
limiting seastate of 3m Hs (Hovland, 2007)
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As Figure 3.2 (Buzza, 2001) shows, the uncertainty improves with data gathering, the 
nearer the date the higher the accuracy. One-day forecasts are much better than 3-day 
forecasts. Gudmestad et al (1999) agrees that proximate forecasts are better but their 
uncertainties are stochastic. A 7-day forecast could be quite reliable if there are stable 
high-pressure atmospheric effects. Using a real life case, the authors demonstrated that 
even with on-site meteorologists, complex projects are at the mercy of unpredictable 
weather. 
To be able to apply MVA to a partly random data, we will need to make certain 
assumptions. Let the data on Figure 3.1 be the original inference, W. Nearer the actual 
date of operation, newer forecasts are collected. T probability of a NEW correct Forecast 
for the weather is designated as "F". Bayes theorem adjusts probabilities given new 
evidence in the following way: 
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Where 
W represents a the original inference i.e. Weather Window and  P (W) is called the prior 
probability of W that was inferred before new evidence, i.e. forecast F, became available. We 
take this as the average probability of having a specified weather window at the specified 
location in a given month. 
P (F / W) is called the conditional probability of seeing the forecast F if the inference W 
happens to be true. It is also called a likelihood function when it is considered as a function 
of W (weather window) for fixed F (forecast).  
P(W / F) is called the posterior probability of W given F. It represents the updated 
probability of finding a desired weather window, with the benefit of new forecast. 
P (F) is called the marginal probability of F: the a priori probability of witnessing the new 
evidence F under all possible inferences. For a set of mutually exclusive forecasts it is 
given by: 
∑= )(*)/()( ii WPWFPFP  
 )(*)/()(*)/( WPWFPWPWFP +=      3.3 
P(F) is called the normalizing constant that is based on the data only. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_probability. Considering this way simplifies the 
computations greatly as we can write P(W/F)= K*P(F/W)*P(W). In general though, we 
say: 
)(*)/()(*)/(
)(*)/()/(
WPWFPWPWFP
WPWFPFWP
+
=     
 Here, we have considered two possible cases for weather, good or bad for 
operation.  
The factor P(F | W) / P(F) measures the impact that the evidence has on the belief in 
the inference. This should be a positive impact in the sense that the sensing of the 
window should improve with newer forecast evidence. In reality the one-day forecasts 
are more reliable than the three-day forecasts (Buzza, 2001).  
 
Fig 3.2: Reliability of Weather Forecasts (taken from Buzza, 2001)  
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According to Buzza (2001), weather forecasts are not perfect because of “growth of 
errors in the initial conditions” and uncertainties in numerical models. Errors also 
depend on “rate of flow” of atmospheric effects. To account for these, “ensemble 
forecasts” based on probabilities of precipitation, wind speeds etc have become 
common. From the trend of reliability (comparison of actual versus predicted) weather 
forecasting has been improving over the years. As at 2000, the last year reported, the 
reliability of three-days-forecasts (TDF) was 94%. For the case of one day forecasts, it is 
actually close to 99.5%! 
However, the actual weather window (WW) duration would not increase. It is the correct 
sensing or forecasting of the window that would affect operations. The operation itself has 
no control on the weather window. It can respond to it by changing location, adjusting 
sequence of operations or waiting on weather (WOW). The extent to which it can do 
these without disruption depends how well the WW was forecasted. 
Berry (1996) used an example of Cancer testing to illustrate this (see Figure 3.3). Suppose 
the incidence of cancer is 1 in 1000. If one has cancer, it would be correctly detected 
90% of the time. If one does NOT have cancer, the test will show that correctly 95% of 
the time. Berry uses Bayesian method to show that, as the uncertainty in the testing is 
much higher than that in the rarer cases, if someone reports a positive cancer test, he 
may actually only have it 1.7% of the time. On the other hand, if someone reports a 
negative test, 99.99% of the time, we can rely on that test verdict. A similar “false 
positive test results” example is presented by Fenton and Neil (2007). This illustrates the 
huge incentive to invest in very reliable testing equipment.  
Cancer
Not
Cancer
0.999
0.0001
0.09
0.01
0.095
0.005
+ve 0.00009
-ve 0.00009
+ve 0. 94905
-ve 0.04995
•Incidence of Cancer = 1/1000
•Sensitivity  of actual  Cancer= 1 – FNR = 90%
•Specificity  of  Not Cancer = 1- FPR = 95%
P(Cancer /+ve)  =     0.009
0.009 + 0.04995
=  0.0177
P(Not Cancer /- ve)  =     0.94905
0.94905 + 0.0001
=  0.9999
Fig 3.3: Cancer screening’s Bayesian inference (Berry, 1996)  
Fortunately, the uncertainty in the measurement of weather is already very good. 
Measurement accuracy was already better than 99.5% for one day forecasts. It only needs 
to be higher than the incidence of the rarer of the two possible events i.e. good weather 
and bad weather. In the summer, incidence of bad weather can be 2% or less. This is the 
worst case. In other months it is in double digits. Thus, the requirement that the 
measuring system should not have higher uncertainties is satisfied easily in all seasons of 
the year, the exception being the summer, when they are in the same order. Even then 
the measuring uncertainty is better by a factor of 4. Thus, we make the assumption that 
the forecasting system has much lower uncertainties throughout the year. 
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Alternate Formulation 
The following alternate version of Bayes formula illustrates the foregoing discussion 
(Berry, 1996). 
)(*)/()(*)/( WPWFPWPWFP +=
)(*)/(
)(*)/(1
1
)(*)/()(*)/(
)(*)/()/(
WPWFP
WPWFPWPWFPWPWFP
WPWFPFWP
+
=
+
=  
The last result is obtained by dividing through by the numerator. Similarly, we can write 
an expression of the form below for posterior bad weather. 
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Dividing the first equation by the second 
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Thus, posterior odds for weather = Likelihood ratio x Prior odds (Berry, 1996).  
If the forecasting of weather is equally accurate for both cases, it means that their 
likelihood is similar and would cancel out. Then the posterior odd would mirror the prior 
odds. This means the variations in the actual weather would mirror variations in the 
forecasted weather very closely. The comparisons between forecasts and actually 
measurement presented in Buzza (2001) indicate that this is so in reality.  
 
3.3 INVESTIGATION MODEL 
Using the modelling tools just described, we will now attempt to model the factors acting 
on schedule. 
3.3.1 Influence of Water depth 
This was the easiest to represent. The jobs are executed at, or close to, the installation 
depths of the subsea facilities. These data are unchanging and was easily retrieved from 
NPD websites for the fields involved. We expect the activities to be more difficult as we 
operate deeper. Thus we should model SPI with the actual water depth (not the 
reciprocal). 
3.3.2 Influence of Equipment disruption 
The hours spent on equipment breakdown (ROV or vessel) is recorded. However, these 
could not be directly used for simulation because they are also included in total 
operational hours. Total hours divided by the planned hours is the SPI, which we aim to 
predict. A different measure predicting disruption was required. One option considered 
is to use a Yes or No rating for equipment breakdown. Such a nominal predictor is 
allowed provided there are only two possibilities. To capture two separate ROVs, we 
would need two different nominal variables. This would be good for understanding the 
past but would have limited forecasting value as the ROV failures are random. 
Factors Influencing On-Schedule Delivery of IMR Subsea Services 
Efosa Emmanuel Uyiomendo. 
49  
 
A more rigorous option is to use a random variable that has a value 1 exactly 97% of the 
time for each ROV. This could then be modelled by Monte Carlo means. This method is 
a better representation of reality of incidence of breakdowns provided the failure 
distributions are known (Aven, 1991). However the incidence of breakdowns alone does 
not capture associated length of delays. Instead, as we noted in section 2.7.3, repair times 
depend more on spares availability (assumed), competence (assumed) and working 
conditions (effectively weather). Thus if we could model weather disruption, the effect of 
equipment could be forecasted by overlaying this by a random variable that is true 3% of 
the time for each ROV. We have seen in section 2.7.3 that this would have escalated 
weather disruption of VO & CMM by a mere 0.09% due to ROV flexibility. MH and LC 
could have been further disrupted by an additional 6%, which is more significant, 
especially in the summer.   
Thus, the variables that would help the understanding of equipment breakdown would 
not help their forecasting.  As the failures are random and quite low (due to high 
reliabilities) a decision was reached NOT to include equipment breakdowns in the set of 
initial MVA analyses. A further justification of this approach is the fact that the ROV 
crew on the vessel is dedicated. Thus the high ROV reliability is not accidental and is 
sustainable. A way would be found to compensate for the shortfall later.  
Thus, we have assumed the following: If there is a failure rapid response or careful 
planning ensures that it does not cause much delay, unless unfavourable condition 
prevents this. Thus equipment related delays (MTTR) would tend to follow weather 
probability. The reality is that delays due to equipment breakdown can escalate due to 
bad weather. Fortunately, weather is more easily modelled.  
A way must be found to introduce the effect of equipment breakdown. This is 
imperative because, in terms of numbers of disruption, the equipment-related ones are at 
least as common as weather-related ones (see appendix).  
3.3.3 Influence of Weather disruption 
Hovland’s (2007) record of the probability of finding a 24 hour weather window for each 
of the operational limits provided the inspiration and data for modelling of weather 
disruption potential. 
The delay associated with this D1 is related to ((1 – P(W/F)) i.e. 
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One could argue that these iterations are done already in the weather forecasts. 
Thousands of initial condition data are gathered and analysed every 12hours by the 
numerical models (Buzza, 2001). Secondly, reported one-day reliability of the weather 
forecasts was already at or above 99.5%. This means that actual weather would follow 
forecasts 99.5% of the time, good or bad. Thus, we can actually model the disruption 
potential or delays to the operation by (1 –W) where W is the average probability of 
having required weather window. 
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The error due to the reliability assumption is not likely to be much. It is possible that the 
error of taking the monthly average for each of the 30 or 31days in a month is even more 
significant. These numbers are based on years of operating data refined with experience. 
They should be reasonably representative. They are adequate for our needs. 
Note that there could be disruption from  
(a) Forecasting bad weather only to receive a good weather  
(b) Forecasting good weather only to receive bad weather  
(c) Forecasting bad weather and actually receiving bad weather.  
If the forecast reliability is excellent, then delays type (a) would be low and insignificant 
compared to delay types (b) and (c). Only these two should actually cause delay. They are 
equivalent to P(notW/F)  + P(notW/notF) = P(notW) i.e. actual probability of bad 
weather. 
Thus, for simplicity the disruption was associated with 1 – W for the MVA. This 
simplification is decent provided that the reliability of the forecasts is excellent. It is at 
least 99.5% as explained above. Once the uncertainty in the measurement system is 
better than the rarity of the bad weather (NotW), the assumption becomes very sound 
indeed.  
Long Duration Tasks: Tasks, extending over several days, deserve special mention. The 
probability of having x successive weather windows operations for a long duration 
operation in TANDEM would be Wx. In this case, total disruption would be related to (1 
- Wx). For a job over 7days, finding a convenient window (say of 3m Hs) in the winter  
would be very difficult.  
In practice, these jobs are sectionalised so that each section fits into a given weather 
window. So the total disruption is the sum of disruptions over all the sections.  In this 
practical case, the SPI would not depend on the number of sections as it is just a ratio of 
hours.  
The assumption being that each section requires the same weather limitation. For MH 
that could be the case but for LC it is not always so. Assuming the worst case weather 
limitation makes for a conservative model.  
Model Weaknesses: Modelling it this way, we are actually trend the potential for 
disruption rather than actual disruption. This is partly due to the fact that we are using 
probabilities of finding 24 hour WW for operation. Out there in the field the month by 
month average maybe different.  
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Fig 3.3:  Factors Influencing Schedule Variance 
(Proposed Investigation Model)  
In addition, the model would be hash on jobs that, on the average, are completed within 
24hours. It would also be more lenient on sectioned jobs as it does not consider the time 
lost for setup etc. 
Finally, when the variables for modelling becomes too large and the computations too 
many, the model could loose its practical value. The planning horizon for IMR is several 
weeks. Anything that would require extensive administration may not be considered very 
useful. 
3.3.4 Work complexity assessment 
For the following discussion, refer to Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Summary of Ratings
Rating Job Tool Diff Lifts V Movmt Subcontr MOC Scope Chg Phases
10 100% New Special Design  >30Te Re-routing   =>5   =>5   =>3 3
Ackward
7 Done in Coy Similar Used >20Te Precise psn   3-4   3-4 2
in Coy Oddly shaped
5 Done once/yr Used yearly  >10Te Rough psn 2 2 1 2
irregular
3 Done 6mnthly Used often Nearby 1 1
0 Generic >6/y No Sp tool reqd Regular Min Restiction 0 0 0 1
Work UncertaintyWork Complexity
 
Job Novelty: Generic jobs are the least likely to suffer overruns because they are well 
understood and they are often repeated quite frequently. These include annual 
inspections, Valve Operations and Basic tool runs (rated 0). In the same vein, completely 
new jobs are the most likely to suffer delays (highest rating of 10). Jobs that the Projects 
had executed before, (7) and within the past year (3) are rated as shown. A job would be 
considered generic if executed more than 6 times per year. 
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Tool Novelty: Specially designed tools have the highest score of 10. A Job with no 
particular tool requirement had the lowest score of 0. If the tool has been used before by 
the Project it was scored 7; used in the last one year scored 5 or used often e.g. monthly, 
score 3. 
Difficult Lifts: This was assessed in terms of weight and awkwardness. Weights above 60% 
of the main crane SWL or 30Te; or 50% of maximum dimension of moonpool;  or are 
irregularly shaped, received the  highest rating. Medium ratings of 7 and 5 were reserved 
for weights over 20Te and 10Te respectively. A score of 0 was reserved for normal loads.  
Vessel Movement: This complexity here relates to the precision required in their co-
ordination  with  weather windows, proper tool placement and the avoidance of objects. 
Lack of adequate precision could cause slippages. The highest rating was given to a job 
requiring re-routing of underwater equipment (e.g. gas line or umbilical) over 
considerable distances and / or deployment of several vessels (10). A medium rating was 
given to jobs requiring a very precise location of equipment such as mating of wellhead 
and Xmas tree (7); a score of 5 for a rough placement and lowest score of 0 for DPS or 
stationary operations. 
Multiple Subcontractors: This increases the number of interfaces. Due to the well developed 
means of communication, the effect of this is on SPI maybe low. If there are 0, 1 and  2 
subcontractors, these were rated  0, 3 and 5 respectively. Between 3 or 4 subcontractors 
were rated a medium score of 7. Above 5 subcontractors was given the highest score 
(10).  
Aggregation: To aggregate the task-related complexity, we note that both tool and job 
measurements are related to the understanding of procedure for the task. They are 
localised and act at the work place. Thus, they maybe correlated in many cases. The 
maximum of these two values may be a better measure than either of them alone. 
Similarly, the maximum rating of vessel movement and lift difficulty could also be a 
better measure. When the vessel is carrying heavy weight, it tends to be stationary i.e. on 
DP. When it is doing a lot of pipeline tracing, it tends to be load-free and  rely on the 
assistance of ROV flights.  
Thus the following were considered as possible models for Complexity: 
InterLiftDifVesselMMaxToolNovJobNovMaxComplexity ++= ),(),(  
InterLiftDifVesselMToolNovJobNovMaxComplexity +++= ),(  
),(),( InterVesMaxLiftDifToolNovJobNovMaxComplexity ++=  
LiftDifVesselMToolNovJobNovMaxComplexity ++= ),(  
),,,,( InterLiftDifVesselMToolNovJobNovMaxComplexity =  
)( InterLiftDifVesselMToolNovJobNovComplexity ++++=  
),(),( LiftDifVesselMMaxToolNovJobNovMaxComplexity +=  
Using the maximum function to combine the measurement areas recognises that they are 
not completely unrelated. A complex job tends to have a new tool or less well 
understood tools. Increasingly, these tend to be heavy or require heavily articulated 
platforms to rest on for access. Most of these are vendor -specific, so for each running 
tool or tie-in-tool mobilised, there will be at least one vendor, which links it to the 
number of interfaces on the ship. Although we did not check this, it may also have 
correlated with number of pictures on the procedure, or the number of hold-points. 
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To determine the best model, these options would be tested by trial MVA runs to find 
the ones that represents the data best.  This would be the model that describes the 
schedule variation best (i.e. highest R2 value), and has the most proportion of significant 
number of variables. If two models are equally good, the one with fewer variables would 
be preferred. 
3.3.5 Measures of work uncertainty 
Management of Change: Some information about the job may reveal itself during 
operations e.g. stuck cover, broken bolts, etc. These often require a change of procedure 
to progress. For such cases, a Management of Change process has been established by 
the Project. This defines the degree of Change based on risk and their approval level. 
Simple changes can be approved offshore by the Offshore Manager. The more extensive 
changes will need re-engineering and Project Manager’s approval. To preserve the 
maximum rating scales of 10, the following rating was adopted: A maximum rating of 10 
was reserved for 5 or more MOCs. A score of 7 was given to between 3 & 4 MOCs, 5 
for 2, 3 for 1 and 0 for nil MOC. 
Scope Change: The key difference between Scope Change and Management of Change 
is that Scope Change is requested by the Client and MOC is a control process 
implemented by the Project over changes considered risky or significant (see section 
2.7.5). The adopted rating is as follows: a maximum score of 10 for 3 or more scope 
changes; and 5 for a single scope change and 0 for no scope changes.  
Phasing: This refers to interruption of execution for reasons that may or may not be 
related to the job. The job is usually re-started under the same sequence. Sometimes, the 
main concern is the significant re-shuffling of the order of the job, in addition to the 
interruption. For the first type an offshore HIRA may be sufficient. This would be 
prepared for each additional tasks or sub-tasks. For the second type, a MOC is required. 
The job is then re-started and completed at another time under the same job number. 
Thus Phasing could influence the total hours expended on the job. A maximum score of 
10 is for 2 interrupts and 3 phases; score 5 for 1 interrupt and 2 phases, and 0 for straight 
execution. 
To combine the Uncertainty rating we follow the same argument above for Complexity 
and explore the following: 
gPhaScopChMOCMaxyUncerta sin),(int +=  
gPhaScopChMOCyUncerta sinint ++=  
)sin,,(int gPhaScopChMOCMaxyUncerta =  
gPhaScopChMOCAverageyUncerta sin),(int +=  
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3.4 ASSESSMENT METHOD 
The initial assessments were done by the author. Each job has a record of its unique job 
numbers, planned and actual hours and the daily progress reports (DPR) on the Project 
server. First the list of jobs executed for the year under review would be compiled. These 
were collated from the DPR website. Sufficient columns were then provided for the 
database for the required assessments. 
Each job is formally reported with an Offshore Report (OR) after completion. These 
ORs detail the activities carried out, their timelines, the equipment used and challenges 
faced. If there was a Management of Change, it is a requirement that this is detailed in 
the report. Also, if the job was executed in phases, it was almost always clear from the 
timeline, from mobilisations to work end. Thus, it was an efficient source of information 
for most of the ratings related to work complexity and especially work uncertainty. Where a 
job had UERs (Undesirable Event Report) it would point to some disruption but this 
was not rated. 
Reference was made to the detailed job procedures additional details about the intentions 
of the jobs, pictures of the tools deployed, the weather allowances, the number of sub-
contractors etc. These are usually prepared and approved well before the execution date. 
They also incorporate one or more Task Plans; at least one for the different sub-tasks the 
job would require. For example: hatch opening, module retrieval, module replacement, 
hatch closing would all have separate task plans  
 
Problems Encountered 
There were three types difficulties faced with the initial rating process just described. The 
first was the consistency of detail available on the Offshore Reports (OR). When a job 
was executed without problems, it is not unusual for the Project Engineer to be very 
succinct in the OR. Conversely, jobs for which problems were encountered tended to 
have more detail. As problems do not necessarily reflect work complexity (often closer to 
work uncertainty), it was always necessary to get familiar with the job procedure (at least in 
generic terms) to be able to assess the job initially. For this reason, unique jobs and 
complex jobs required far more reading and review.  
Similarly, there were also stylistic and systematic differences in the ORs. The reports 
called FHR (First Hand Reports) had very little detail. Some of these differences were 
probably due to different individual’s way of presenting facts and the value he / she 
attach to information. For the first kind i.e. FHR, the problem was resolved by the 
decision to exclude Annual Inspections from the range of analyses. This category of 
inspections, as per requirement, was almost exclusively reported by FHR. For the second 
kind, the problem was ameliorated by pre-reading detailed generic procedures, and the 
subsequent review of assessments carried out for each case. 
The final and most important challenge encountered during those initial assessments was 
that of language. A large proportion of the Offshore Reports were written in Norwegian. 
This proportion increased the further we go back in time. Given the very busy nature of 
the Project Engineers, it was not feasible to expect them to undertake the initial 
assessments or help with translations. Instead, the decision was taken very early to limit 
the scope of analysis to years 2008, 2007 and 2006. Around 30%, 60% and 80% 
respectively of these reports were in Norwegian. Without exception, their job procedures 
were in English. The ORs were translated with the aid of Google translate. They were 
then cross-referenced with their job procedures. The Project checked the process and 
considered it to have an acceptable accuracy for the work intended. 
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3.4.1 Assessment consolidation and review 
Each of the responsible Project Engineers was invited to review the initial assessments 
for 2008 jobs. Their subsequent reviews were used as a guide for the 2007 and 2006 
assessments. The process adopted is now described.  
In most cases, two Project Engineers are involved at the offshore execution. And at least 
two (not necessarily the same) are also involved at the planning phase at the office. 
Preference was given to the team that actually executed the jobs as the procedure 
intention is not always the site reality.  
Where the reviews done by site Project Engineer is within an assessment step of the one 
done by the author, it is carried on board after some discussion to understand the areas 
of difference. When the reviewed assessment is two or more steps removed from the 
author’s assessment, effort was made to reconcile the difference. This involved mutual 
review of the OR until an agreement was reached. Sometimes the difference in the 
assessment was due to new information. An example of this is when it became clear that 
some Valve Operations require very high torque (VHT) tools. These are more complex 
than the basic ROV tools, and they are handled more carefully to protect the valve, 
equipment and personnel. They are always pre-calibrated to the ROV and the valve to be 
operated. This sort of clarification was applied to all similar assessments where such tools 
are used, if not already made clear by another PE.  
Another example is when it was brought to the author’s notice that, besides the 
complexity associated with vessel movement, ROV movements may also be complex. 
This was the case when the template on which it was deployed was very compacted and 
dense with facilities. Thus ROV movement was also considered in the assessment of 
vessel movement dimension of complexity. 
In terms of consolidation, a problem arose when two or more Project Engineers had 
different review submissions. When these were in the same order (one step removed) the 
highest rating was accepted for each dimension. Otherwise it was discussed further with 
at least one of them. When this was not possible, the assessment closest to the author’s 
was accepted for low risk or well understood jobs; whereas the highest relevant rating 
was accepted for unique or new jobs. These cases were very few. 
3.4.2 Plans and schedules 
The following are the observations during the assessment process. 
Float usage: Proposed duration is initially generous. Over time, this is made more 
realistic as the details of the execution conditions and job procedure becomes more 
definite. Thus, the proposed schedule during the week of execution is the most realistic. 
This allows new or urgent jobs to be planned within the float. 
Rolling plan: The MS Project is always rolling several weeks ahead. The jobs that had 
not been executed by the next weekly update are re-prioritized.  
Urgent jobs: These are sometimes completely planned offshore. Included are Module 
Handling Jobs, Valve Operations and Condition Monitoring. Their solutions are 
standardised. It is possible for some of these jobs to be received, planned and completed 
before the next plan update. This means that some jobs may not even appear on the plan 
at all. This reflects the degree of responsiveness of the operation to urgent jobs. 
Constraints: The on board space available on the vessel constrains the amount of 
equipment that can be mobilised at once. Control modules and running tools  are quite 
bulky. Only two or three can be mobilised at once on the vessel. There are three types of 
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control modules normally installed on the Client facilities: FMC, Vetco and Aker 
Solutions. Each of these requires its own specialized running tool that is not 
interchangeable. Thus, trips to the jetty for the purpose of mobilisation of equipment can 
be required in between seemingly similar jobs.  
Running tool readiness: Sometimes, running tools may not be readily available when 
required. Vessel time may be spent waiting for the overhaul and testing of the RT to 
readiness levels. Such times are not always captured on the daily reports and are not 
included in these analyses. 
Parallel operations: This is quite positive. It was observed that when long duration 
operations such as pigging and umbilical flushing are ongoing, it is possible to plan and 
execute short and straightforward operations within them. 
Work prioritization: Some jobs have to be executed on a fixed date. This is the highest 
priority and other jobs must be stopped or other vessel found to do them. Other jobs are 
very urgent and will be executed at the most convenient point once the planning is 
completed. Such jobs are often on top of the schedule and “floated” along. A larger 
proportion of the jobs on the sequence appear to be scheduled by efficiency 
considerations (deferments, readiness, nearest site, similar jobs and weather 
considerations). Finally, a handful of jobs are considered not priority and appear to be 
used to enhance vessel utilization. This last category is the first to be moved when an 
urgent job comes up. 
Crew change: Project operational personnel stay two weeks at a time on the vessel. 
Marine crew spend 4 weeks before rotation.  Tour duration was doubled recently (one to 
two, two to four respectively). The vessel has a helipad but time is always provided for 
crew change because of stricter vessel motion requirements for chopper landing. Thus 
each crew change requires a port call. Time spent will depend on the location the vessel 
was working at. It could be as low as 4 hours of sailing or as much as 12 hours of sailing.  
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4. RESULTS 
In this chapter, the results of the analyses are discussed. Two sets of analyses were 
carried out. First was Bulk analyses of the data. This involves clustering of the data in 
various forms. Secondly, MVA of the data was carried out. They were aimed at arriving 
at a reasonable response to the each of the proposed Hypothesis. Due to their nature, 
each type has different level of applicability. 
 
4.1 BULK ANALYSES RESULTS 
4.1.1 Overview of bulk analyses results 
In total, 365 jobs were reviewed and considered for analyses. From these, 65 jobs were 
removed because they were basic inspections with insufficient data to support the 
assessments of the sub-elements complexity and uncertainty. In addition, 59 other jobs 
were excluded because they were stand-by related (e.g. crane or ROV-assisted anchor 
handling). Another 35 jobs were discounted because their schedule plans were not 
available, making it impossible to compute the SPI. Eventually, 206 jobs were available 
for analyses. 
 
Table 4.1 Breakdown of Jobs
jobs % jobs % jobs %
Condition Monitoring & Fault Finding CM & FF 16 14.4 23 18.9 33 25.0
Valve Operations & Commissioning VO 10 9.0 12 9.8 38 28.8
Module Handling MH 11 9.9 12 9.8 15 11.4
Light Constr/ Repair Works/Pigging RW/LC/PO 27 24.3 18 14.8 26 19.7
Excluded (Annual Inspections) 27 24.3 38 31.1 0 0.0
Excluded (Std By, No OR) 20 18.0 19 15.6 20 15.2
Total Jobs Available 111 122 132
Total Included 64 57.7 65 53.3 112 84.8
Jobs with Non-retrievable Plans 12 7 16
Total Jobs with complete data 52 58 96
200820072006
Job or Operation Type
 
 
Overall activity level  is evenly spread across the four groups of jobs. 
• Condition Monitoring and Fault Finding (CM & FF) 
• Valve Operations (VO) 
• Module Handling (MH) 
• Light Construction (LC i.e. repairs, construction and pigging operations, etc). 
On closer examination (see Figure 4.1) there is a discernable increase in the number of 
jobs and hours for valve operations across these three years. A possible explanation for 
this is the fact that overtime, the need for manual ROV opening of  subsea valves 
increases for the facilities with remote operations.  Their remote actuators may fail or the 
valves may become too stiff for them. In these cases, their actuator would be overridden 
and operated manually with ROV.  
From a mid 2007, the Project Vessel focused away from regular inspections in favour of 
jobs requiring some prior planning (Module Handling & Light Construction). This is 
more evident in the job number trend than in the hours worked trend (Figure 4.1). The 
2007 hours was somewhat low because the vessel was away for dry-docking for about 
45days. 
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4.1.2 Depth trend 
Shown in figs 4.2 below is the trend of number of jobs and accumulated hours for four 
different ranges of operating water depths. Fewest hours is spent at facilities below 
480m. There vast majority of  facilities are in the 180 – 330m range. The Tampen area, 
arguably the most active, lies between 300m and 350m. The Project facilities are rated for 
1500m. 
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Thus, as discussed earlier, the depth trend is expected to be mild. None is revealed clearly 
here. This is possibly due to the masking effects of other variables such as weather and 
complexity. The MVA should be able to discern such “hidden” patterns because up to 16 
variables would be analysed at the same time. 
 
4.1.3 Season trend  
Shown in Figure 4.3 below is the trend of the overall jobs with SPI. The independent 
variable in the first case is schedule variance and for the second case is the proportion of 
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jobs experiencing delays i.e. slipped beyond 110% of the original planned schedule. A 
screening level of 110% SPI was selected. The US DOE study recommended a range of 
90% - 115% for “Green” performance. This is a double-sided rating. The multi-variable 
analyses would also double-sided as schedule performance below and above plan are 
equally modelled. However, to discern patterns in bulked or clustered data on a chart, it 
is considered sufficiently prudent to set  a realistic but challenging screening level. This 
could have been any level within the upper bound of “Green”, as challenging over-
consumption of resources is more interesting. The level of 110% was because only the 
based on the author’s experience and Industry practice. Lost hours are paid for at a lower 
rate, so the burden is shared. Thus it is the interest of the Industry to challenge the 
operation at least in the upper bound. This would certainly be the view of the Clients. 
The project wants to be more efficient and this is clearly symbolised by commissioning 
this project. It is clear that the Project is taking the proactive step of seeking measures for 
enhancing efficiency whilst the penalties for slippages are still very mild. 
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The MVA will not have any ceiling or screening level. The calculated SPI would be used 
for the analysis directly. Thus its result would be even-handed. 
Based on the 110% level, it is clear from Figure 4.3 that autumn and winter seasons were 
the most challenged by schedules. The winter case is understandable and expected. The 
slippages in autumn could be due to optimistic schedules. Many of the autumn jobs are 
carried over from the summer. The other reason adduced by the project managers is that, 
traditionally, a huge number of jobs are reserved for the summer months. Together with 
breakdown and urgent jobs, several of these jobs eventually slip into the autumn when 
the probability of disruption is higher. The planned scheduled for the summer months 
are also tighter for the same reason. 
Summer jobs pack is also a possible explanation for the deterioration in VO schedule 
variance in those normally forgiving months.  
 
4.1.4 Effects of disruption 
Figure 4.4 supports the assumption that disruption causes loss of efficiency (i.e.  H2). 
This is to be expected. Disruption causes more set-up changes, consumes precious 
weather windows and generally leads to several starts and stops. 
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4.1.5 Efficiency trend over time 
Three years data is rather inadequate for justifying a trend. The strong seasonal weather 
effects could also mask any other variation whose frequency is lower than the annual 
cycle. With these constraints in mind, we have plotted the average SPI for each activity 
on an annual basis in Figure 4.5. 
This trend is very important for gleaning the existence or otherwise of the competitive 
factors of efficiency and innovation. This is particularly important because MVA does 
not reveal it directly (unless we repeat the data on an annual basis). From Figure 4.5, 
there is a slight but definite increase in SPI from 2006 to 2008 for three of the job types 
(VO, MH and LC&RW). CMM&F show a slight drop over those years. The change is 
almost imperceptible (so the raw data will be included in the appendix). Overall, we 
cannot argue that there has been a defined increase in efficiency over these years. This 
conclusion can also be reached from the year-to-date Figure shown in the last column.  
Now MH & LC/RW types of jobs (the most complex) contributed 78%, 81% and 68% 
respectively of 2006, 2007 and 2008 actual working hours. All of these show a very slight 
increase in SPI. If VO is included, the total percent of hours showing efficiency decrease 
would be 84, 88 and 81% respectively for the same years. The balance was CMM/FF 
which showed a slight improvement in efficiency. Thus we can infer that whereas there 
has been a very noticeable increase in the proportion of difficult job being undertaken 
over the years 2006 - 2008, their efficiency has been somewhat stable or slightly worse 
off. 
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Finally the trend-line on Figure 4.5 shows a clear increase of SPI with job complexity. 
The more complex jobs tend to have higher SPI. Since the proportion of hours worked 
on complex jobs is increasing, how do we discern the portion of SPI variation due to 
complexity changes and the proportion due to efficiency gains (or losses)? Hopefully the 
MVA can provide some assistance. 
 
4.2 MULTIVARIABLE ANALYSES OF SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE 
The summary of results obtained from the MVA analyses is shown on Table 4.2 and the 
actual results for the best two are shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. These analyses were done 
with the complete 182 samples of jobs with the outliers removed. In all but the last 
analysis, the number of independent variables was four: Water Depth (Km), Disruption 
Potential (i.e. 1 – W the probability of 24hr operation in the appropriate limiting Hs in 2 
decimal places), Complexity and Uncertainty. The last analysis modelled each of the sub-
variables of Complexity and Uncertainty separately. Its results were sub-optimal and 
rejected. 
Table 4.2: Summary of MVA Results
Model Complexity Uncertainty # Variables
# Significant 
Variables
Proportion 
Significant
R Square
Adjusted 
R Square
All Variables
Insignifcant 
Variables
Best Max(J, T, L, V, I) Avg(M, S) + P 4 4 100% 53.90% 52.56%
WD, DisPot, 
Compl, Uncerty
None
Alternate 1 Max(J, T, L, V, I) Max (M, S, P) 4 3 75% 53.21% 51.86% Ditto Uncerty
Alternate 2 SUM(J+T+L+V+I) Max(M, S) + P 4 3 75% 52.72% 51.36% Ditto Compl
Alternate 3 SUM(J+T+L+V+I) SUM(M+S+P) 4 3 75% 52.59% 51.23% Ditto Compl
Alternate 4 Max(J, T)+L+V Max(M, S) + P 4 3 75% 52.35% 50.98% Ditto Compl
Alternate 5 Max(J, T) +Max(L, V, I) Max(M, S) + P 4 3 75% 52.33% 50.96% Ditto Compl
Alternate 6 Max(J, T) Max(M, S) + P 4 3 75% 52.27% 50.91% Ditto Compl
Rejected Max(J, T) +Max(L,V) Max(M, S) + P 4 2 50% 52.72% 51.36%
Ditto Compl & 
Uncerty
Rejected
Separate modeling (J, 
L,T,V,I) 
Separate (M, S, P) 
modeling
10 3 30% 42.01% 38.82%
WD, DisPot, J, T, 
L, V, I, M, S, P
J, T, L, V, I, 
M, S
J = Job, T = Tool, L = Lifting, V =Vessel, I = Interface. 
M = Management of Change, S = Scope Change, P = Phasing
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Table 4.3: Summary output of the Best model
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.7342 Complexity Max(Job,Tool, Lift, Vessel, Interface)
R Square 0.5390 Uncertainty Average(MOC, Scope Change) + Phasing
Adjusted R Square 0.5256
Standard Error 1.1721
Observations 182
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4 285.906116 71.476529 52.0270732 6.45933E-29
Residual 178 244.542339 1.37383336
Total 182 530.448454
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
Water Depth 1.4134 0.4466 3.1647 0.0018 0.5321 2.2947 0.5321 2.2947
Disruption Potential 1.2723 0.4115 3.0923 0.0023 0.4604 2.0843 0.4604 2.0843
Complexity 0.0713 0.0349 2.0468 0.0422 0.0026 0.1401 0.0026 0.1401
Uncertainty 0.0773 0.0306 2.5249 0.0124 0.0169 0.1377 0.0169 0.1377  
The columns for Complexity and Uncertainty show how their elemental ratings criteria 
were combined for each case. The Best model i.e. the recommended model has all the 
four independent variables significant (p-value <0.05) and has and has the highest R2 
value of 53.9%. This means that 53.9% of the variations in SPI are explained by the 
variations in the independent variables.  
Each of the next five alternatives has a  similar R2 value (between 52 and 53%). As an 
example, Table 4.4 shows the result for the first alternative.  Like most of the rest,  only 3 
of its 4 independent variables met the test for significance. This fact alone makes each of 
the other options less attractive. Only the Best-case model had all its variables significant. 
An example of rejected model is show in Table 4.4. Only two of the independent 
variables are significant. Because of this, we ignored the fact that its R2 value was  
relatively high at 55%.  
Table 4.4:  Summary output of Rejected model.
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.742812347 Model Complexity & Uncertainty Variable Separately
R Square 0.551770183
Adjusted R Square 0.522502344
Standard Error 1.175730386
Observations 182
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 10 292.6856 29.2686 21.17317229 2.9458E-25
Residual 172 237.7628 1.3823
Total 182 530.4485
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
WatDepth, m 0.0014 0.0005 3.1508 0.0019 0.0005 0.0023 0.0005 0.0023
DisrupPot 1.7913 0.4432 4.0418 0.0001 0.9165 2.6661 0.9165 2.6661
Job 0.0387 0.0637 0.6077 0.5442 -0.0870 0.1645 -0.0870 0.1645
Tool 0.1048 0.0566 1.8504 0.0660 -0.0070 0.2166 -0.0070 0.2166
Diffct Lifts 0.0250 0.0546 0.4586 0.6471 -0.0827 0.1328 -0.0827 0.1328
V Mvmnt -0.0597 0.0475 -1.2557 0.2109 -0.1535 0.0341 -0.1535 0.0341
MSbcont -0.0338 0.0669 -0.5058 0.6136 -0.1659 0.0982 -0.1659 0.0982
MOC -0.0113 0.0718 -0.1569 0.8755 -0.1529 0.1304 -0.1529 0.1304
Scope Chg -0.0024 0.0461 -0.0525 0.9582 -0.0935 0.0886 -0.0935 0.0886
Phasing 0.1154 0.0425 2.7129 0.0073 0.0314 0.1993 0.0314 0.1993  
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To exclude the possibility of power law, a similar MVA was carried out for the logarithm 
of each of the separate variables (results not show). Only one of the four independent 
variables was significant. In addition the R2 value was only 7%. Without further analyses, 
we inferred that power law is better. 
Similarly, we confirmed our assumption that the intercept has to be zero by running a 
similar MVA to the Best Case without the requirement that the intercept be zero. The 
results (not show) were much worse. The R2 value dropped to 7.5% and only uncertainty 
an intercept were significant. 
Finally, Table 4.5 shows the correlation matrix for the best case model. It is clear that the 
highest correlation between the variables is 0.31 (between disruption potential & 
complexity; and between complexity and uncertainty). As the r  values are all well below 
1, we can accept that the independent variables are sufficiently unrelated. 
 
Table 4.5: Correlation Matrix for Best Case Model
Water 
Depth
Disruption 
Potential
Complexity Uncertainty
Water Depth 1
Disruption Potential -0.0332 1.0000
Complexity 0.2193 0.3151 1.0000
Uncertainty 0.1752 0.1353 0.3097 1.0000
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5. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
5.1 MODEL FOR PREDICTING SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE 
Table 4.3 shows the MS Excel MVA Results for the recommended model. From this, we 
can propose the following for the prediction of SPI: 
[ ])),(077.0),,,,(071.0)1(273.1413.1 PSMAvgIVLTJMaxWWDepthSPI +++−+=
  
Where, 
WDepth = Water Depth  (Km),  
W = 1 – DisrPot = Probability of having a 24Hour weather window at the appropriate 
limiting Seastate (for the job, location and month see Figure 3.1),  
Max(J,T,L,V,I) = Effective Complexity and  
Average (M,S) +P = Effective Uncertainty. 
 
5m Hs 62 65 78 87 93 99 99 95 90 85 75 68
3m Hs 38 42 50 68 87 89 92 90 70 50 44 37
Job Type DurationComplexity Uncertainty Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
VO 24 3 0 1.12 1.09 0.92 0.81 0.73 0.65 0.65 0.70 0.77 0.83 0.96 1.05
CMM & FF 24 5 0 1.27 1.23 1.06 0.95 0.87 0.80 0.80 0.85 0.91 0.97 1.10 1.19
MH 48 7 2.5 1.91 1.86 1.75 1.52 1.28 1.26 1.22 1.24 1.50 1.75 1.83 1.92
LC 72 10 5 2.31 2.26 2.16 1.93 1.69 1.66 1.62 1.65 1.91 2.16 2.24 2.33
Table 5.1:    Typical IMR 
Jobs at 303m Water Depth
PREDICTED SPI VALUES
 
Shown in Table 5.1 are the SPI predicted by this model for four typical jobs undertaken 
at 303m. The values for Complexity and Uncertainty are typical for those kinds of jobs. 
Figure 5.1 shows a plot of the predicted SPI against month of operation. It is clear that 
SPI is lowest in the summer months because of better weather. The differences in SPI 
between simple and more complex operations are increased during the winter months. 
5.1.1 Verdict on hypotheses 
From the model equation alone, we can reach conclusions on following hypothesis. SPI 
depends on water depth. The deeper the operation the more likely that it would be 
delayed (i.e. H1 is True). SPI does depend on weather disruptions or disruption generally. 
Higher disruption potential causes longer delays. From the discussions in section 2.7.3 
and 3.3.2, we can reach the same conclusions about equipment breakdowns (i.e. H3 is 
potentially true). However, these effects are likely to be felt more for MH and LC 
operations. This can be checked by a separate analysis. 
As expected, the hypotheses about complexity and uncertainty are also true. Higher 
levels of complexity and uncertainty are associated with higher levels of SPI (longer 
delays). Thus, H4 and H5 are also true.  
A decision cannot be directly reached for H6, H7 and H8 from the model alone but a 
reasonable verdict can be reached in conjunction with Figure 5.1. Overlaid with the 
predicted values of SPI for each operation is the inverse operability for each month (3m 
and 5m). Now, if the Vessel were to focus everyday in the month on a particular 3m 
operation, if we ignore all other possible sources of disruption, the downtime would be 
strictly be WOW or (1-W) and operations time would be W. Thus, the pseudo-SPI in this 
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case would be I/W or inverse operability. These are plotted besides the predicted values 
discussed earlier. 
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It is clear that in the summer months, the weather  operability is excellent for both types 
of operations but punishes the 3m severely during the winter. Compared to the 
prediction, the 3m and 5m operations are a lot closer during the summer and slightly 
closer in the winter. Even then, the general pattern is the same as the predictive model 
involving all the four variables. In the winter months, where there is a much greater 
difference in the operability for 3m and 5m jobs, there is a sound argument for a 
balanced mix of jobs. (In the summer months, there is less to be gained). This means that 
H6 has to be true. 
This model is simple as it has only four variables. It would be quick and practical because 
the data for water depth  and W are easily available. The assessment of Complexity and 
Uncertainty are interesting in different ways. First consider Complexity. From the model 
expression only the maximum rated value for any of the five elements (job, tool, lift, 
vessel, interfaces) is required. So, only variables that are most likely to present the most 
difficulty need be considered in great detail. This would make it more practical indeed. So 
for light construction, the tooling and lifting would be the most interesting. For Module 
Handling jobs at older wellheads, it could be any of them. Any of the tools, interfaces 
and lifts could be the most complex.  
Uncertainty is very different. By their very nature, NONE of its 3 elements can be 
assessed until after the job is started. On the one hand this greatly limits the potential for 
its use for prediction. On the other hand it also aids the understanding of the variations 
in SPI. 
If we ignore the inherent uncertainty completely (i.e. take the coefficient as zero) and 
model with only three variables, we would end with an unrealistic model. If we keep it 
on, we would be forced to adopt some average level of Uncertainty level. This would be 
open challenged by planning purists. If the basis for the average values are sound and 
representative (e.g. age of template, last operation, previous experience etc), such a 
challenge could be avoided. 
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5.2 EVALUATION OF INFLUENCE FACTORS 
Next, let us rank the variables. Table 4.5 shows  the Best-case  MVA model done with 
standardised variables for the purpose of ranking. Focus on the coefficients of the 
variables.  
Table 5.2: Standardised Regression for Best Model
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.2740
R Square 0.0751
Adjusted R Square 0.0539
Standard Error 0.9698
Observations 182
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4 13.58753998 3.39688499 3.61170979 0.007406877
Residual 178 167.4125452 0.94051992
Total 182 181.0000851
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
Wdepth-Std -0.0299 0.0749 -0.3990 0.6904 -0.1777 0.1179 -0.1777 0.1179
DisrupPot-Std 0.0494 0.0765 0.6457 0.5193 -0.1016 0.2005 -0.1016 0.2005
Complex-Std 0.0946 0.0809 1.1697 0.2437 -0.0650 0.2542 -0.0650 0.2542
Uncertain-Std 0.2181 0.0764 2.8530 0.0048 0.0672 0.3689 0.0672 0.3689  
 
Table 5.3: Standardised coefficients ranking
Standardised  Variable Coefficient Relative* Rank Average Std Dev
Wdepth-Std -0.02988 1.00 1 0.27km 0.16km
DisrupPot-Std 0.04942 -1.65 2 0.28 0.20
Complex-Std 0.09462 -3.17 3 3.63 2.75
Uncertain-Std 0.21809 -7.30 4 1.64 3.02
SPI 1.27 1.14
*relative is computed wrt Wdepth i.e water depth.  
The standardised results adjust these independent variables to units of their standard 
deviations. These allow the relative sensitivity of SPI to each of the variables to be 
compared on an equal basis. Table 4.6 shows that a change of 0.03 standard deviations in 
Water Depth could cause a change of one standard deviation in SPI. Similarly, a change 
of 0.049 standard deviations in Disruption Potential would cause a change of one 
standard deviation in SPI. The corresponding value for Complexity and Uncertainty are 
0.095 and 0.22.  
Thus, the ranking in terms of sensitivity should be Water Depth > Disruption Potential 
> Complexity > Uncertainty. 
Clearly, the most sensitive variable seems to be water depth. A change of one standard 
deviation in water depth is equivalent to a change of 0.16Km, or 160m, in operating 
water depth. This is enough to swing the SPI by 1.14. However the Project has no 
control over depths of operations.  
Next, SPI is most-sensitive to weather disruption potential. A change in 1 standard 
deviation in SPI (i.e. a swing of 1.14) can be driven by any 0.20 change in probability of 
W. Referring to Figure 3.1, this kind of swing in probability of having a 24hour weather 
window is possible in the following scenarios: 
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• Re-scheduling a 3m Hs NNS Operation from August to September 
• Re-scheduling a 3m Hs NNS Operation from September to October 
• Re-scheduling a 3m Hs SNS Operation from July to October 
• Re-scheduling a 5m Hs NNS/SNS/NS Operation from July to November 
• Re-scheduling a 5m Hs NNS/SNS/NS Operation from September to December 
Each of these scenarios is possible because of tighter scheduling, increasing number of 
competing jobs, resource availability, vessel maintenance and changes in relative 
priorities. So, when any of these happen, a swing of 1 SD in SPI or 1.14 is possible. 
Fortunately, in association with the Client, this can also be used to a good effect. The 
Project & Client can plan certain jobs for certain periods because they consider them less 
risky, less likely to slip in schedule or more profitable overall, all things considered.   
SPI is least sensitive to Complexity and Uncertainty. It is 2 times less sensitive to 
Complexity than it is to Disruption Potential; and compared with Water Depth it is 3.2 
times less sensitive. Similarly, SPI is around 4 times  less sensitive to Uncertainty than it 
is to Disruption Potential, and 7.3 times less sensitive, when compared with Water 
Depth (see table 4.6).  
These may appear good but may be counter-intuitive. The Project’s meteorologists have 
a means of forecasting weather and reducing its impact on operations. It cannot change 
the weather but it can ensure that the most critical parts of the operations are executed 
under the best conditions. In the same vein, complex jobs reveal themselves during 
planning. 
Unfortunately, there is no easy look-ahead for Uncertainty. They just happen. And when 
they do, the job is likely to feel their impact. In many cases, the more sensitive variables 
may partly mask them, but their effects are unmistakable. 
 
5.3 HOW TO IMPROVE THE MODEL 
There could be linearization errors in regression model. A significant portion of the 
interaction between the factors is dynamic, unstable and random.  The crew could 
choose to use adverse weather condition to do proactive maintenance on equipment, to 
sail to a different location or undertake crew change. A more advanced technique would 
be required for analysing such relationships. In addition, it is possible that some variables 
would have been omitted and this would join the noise term (Sykes, 1988).  
Given the adopted model, there may have been some measurement errors introduced as 
a result of data quality, language problems and inadequate opportunities for reviews with 
field based personnel. The review process had to be adapted to the availability of the 
Senior Project Engineers. To allow for a more efficient and potentially more robust study 
in the future, the data capture should not only be more formalised, it should also be 
automated. In particular, we have assumed that the weather operability data reported by 
Hovland (2007) is sufficient and accurate. The 5m Hs weather limitation for the relevant 
operating window was extrapolated from the 3m figure and their relative annual average. 
The availability of actual figures would improve the accuracy.  
There is no full agreement yet on the best way to model complexity (Edmonds, 1999). 
Each approach would probably leave something out. Other possible complexity variables 
that should be considered for future investigation include the number of procedure 
steps, the number of hold points, the number of pictures, and some combination of 
these. It is also possible model the cognitive requirement for each job. 
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Offshore personnel are all very competent. However, they are NOT always 
interchangeable. Even then, personnel variability was not coded. It would have been 
distracting  and, in any case, there was no data. The issue of personnel temporal factors 
like fatigue, stress, length of stay offshore, night operations, can also be important. 
Parkes and Swash (2000) and Miles (2001) found that injuries statistics on offshore 
platforms  depend on them. These temporal effects are also likely to be significant for an 
offshore vessel because of the greater vessel motions. 
The urgency of job can force the selection of the most readily available tools and 
solutions. These may not always be the most optimal.  The most urgent jobs would not 
have appeared on the plan. Thus excluding this category of jobs compensated for the 
random effects of urgency. Data was not available for verifying these. 
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Fortunately, we do have data for verifying the possible contribution of equipment 
breakdown that was effectively excluded from the analyses. A Monte Carlo simulation was 
carried out to check the contribution of equipment availabilities (see appendix for 200-
2008 average) on the effective operability. These were Vessel (97%), ObsROV (91%) and 
Work ROV (96%). The results are shown in Figure 5.2. The 3m Hs job types are more 
sensitive to equipment availabilities because it requires both ROV to proceed. It was 
assumed that the 5m operations could be undertaken with either ROV. The first set of 
simulations was done with the actual average availabilities of the equipment mentioned 
above. Then for each repeat simulation, it was assumed that the Vessel is 100% available, 
then Vessel+ObsROV and so on. As expected, the best results were returned when all 
the equipment is available (operability of 89%, from a base case of 50%). Equipment 
availability is potentially as significant as weather in terms of operability. Being more 
random than weather, and more difficult to predict, its operational disruption effects 
might actually be higher. 
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5.4 METHODS FOR MANAGING SCHEDULE RISK FACTORS 
The project adopts several methods for coping with the factors influencing schedule 
performance. These are listed below. 
5.4.1 Coping with weather disruption 
The crew changed can be delayed of brought forward. The plans can be changed in order 
to bring forward planned or required logistics and perform this during a bad weather 
window. It is possible to plan for weather limited jobs days and even weeks ahead and be 
ready to interrupt other jobs when the opportunity arises. It helps if the Vessel is 
working in the area. Another measure is the early launch, wet storing and late recovery of 
equipment strict weather tolerability.  
To determine the latest weather forecast, on-board links (internet, telephone & email) to 
meteorologists can also aid planning. Though it is possible to change location, in practice 
it is not always feasible because the jobs are in the same weather cell, the patterns tend to 
the similar and the jobs schedule follow Client priorities. 
5.4.2 Managing the challenge of Water depth 
It is possible to allow for longer launch and deployment times, and take advantage of 
longer weather windows (especially aiming to start in the falling period). The Project 
would avoid mid winter in planning for the most complex job if it can. During the 
operation, required tools are often deployed at once in a basket and wet-stored. Similarly, 
deploying all the equipment, covers and aids required for wet-storing helps to manage 
adverse weather conditions.  
Offshore personnel look ahead several steps in the operation and take advantage of 
suitable weather windows to undertake the more limited steps. They can use heave 
dampers for the awkward loads as AHC do not work very well in greater depths. 
Dampers have circa 2.5m stroke and should be suitable up to 1.5m Hs. Guide wires can 
also be used to make tool and light equipment trips from  the sea bottom to surface as 
these can be faster than ROVs. 
Exposure to entanglement is higher in deeper waters. One reason for this higher is the 
greater risk of criss-crossing water current. Usually transponders are launched along with 
the tool or equipment to provide a continuous fix on its location and minimise if not 
eliminate the risk of loss or entanglement. 
The risk of equipment failures (seals, ingress of water, cable earth faults) is higher at deep 
water operations. Pre-launch checks are usually done and proactive repairs are completed 
to avoid their getting worse at less auspicious conditions. 
Stress cycles are higher in deeper waters for at least two reasons. There is higher pressure 
exposure. Even more important, there is a higher risk that the ROVs would be 
withdrawn closer to the operating limits because of the longer trip times. The associated 
snap loads can stress the weakest parts of the ROV. 
5.4.3 Managing Complexity in IMR projects 
Usually the most interesting issue is new tools. The jobs tend to be variations of previous 
ones. New tools are subjected to FATs, test runs and design reviews. There is risk of 
miss-match of both ROV and subsea wellhead interfaces. ROV interface is easier to get 
before the operation. Subsea installations can be customised to the particular 
requirement of the installation. Then, they could be modified after initial installation. 
Thus there is more risk of subsea interface miss-match. This can be controlled by 
undertaking a real survey of the site well before the planning of the job. Pictures, 
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measurements and actual configurations would help to minimise the risk of miss-match. 
A very good example is the use of dummy diver to check adequate diving access. It is 
also possible to undertake site modifications (cutting, grinding and welding). 
Lifting complexity requires good engineering planning (rigging, spreader design, 
procedures and risks analyses, etc). Each lifting job is preceded by a dedicated lifting plan 
approved at an appropriate level. Deployment analyses complete with animation and 
hydrodynamic simulation of the Vessel loads and various possible wave heights and wind 
speeds. 
Risk Assessments or more specifically: HIRA 1 (office), HIRA 2 (offshore) and HIRA 3 
(at tool box talks) help identify the risks and implement measures for the job. The risk 
assessment matrix follows the industry standard of frequency and severity. 
5.4.4 Managing Uncertainty 
Be prepared for the unknown. Having a modern workshop and workforce with multiple 
skills facilitates quick modifications. The presence of Client Reps, online links to 
managers at the office aids quick decision making. Access to previous jobs reports in the 
planning process helps to avoid it in the first place. 
5.4.5 Noise terms 
There are some “variables” that may not be accounted for and would enter the noise 
terms. 
Range of depths: Especially in the statutory inspections, operations could span over a wide 
area of depth rather than one particular depth  
Fill-in jobs: Before merger there were more fill-in jobs and greater willingness to use 
Inspections for situations of adverse weather. Recently, Valve operations and similar 5m 
Hs jobs have served this role. However, they are fewer in number and require more prior 
planning than annual inspections. 
Crew changes: Before March 2008, crew changes for Project’s operational crew were 
undertaken every week. Now operational crew change every fortnight, and the marine 
crew 14 days. Contractually, crew change could be done a day early or a day later than 
Wednesday. Less regular crew changes provides less opportunity for coping with adverse 
weather with these port calls. Although the vessel is designed for helicopter landing, this 
is less favoured because of vessel motions and the fact that every other crew change, 
when the marine personnel are also rotated, the chopper requirements would be more 
than one. Thus, most crew changes are done with port calls. As Operations have 
extended over  a wider area than the Tampen area, the sailing time is often longer than 
the 4hours it used to take from say, Troll, to Bergen. 
Wind: Sometimes, wind speed and direction could be the limitation. It is required that on 
DP not more than 50% of vessel power is expended on keeping station. Sometimes high 
wind forces make it is necessary to suspend or delay an operation because of wind for 
one hour or more. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The number of subsea oil and gas wells has been growing rapidly. Securing production 
from these wells require effective and efficient subsea maintenance services. The IMR 
industry provides these maintenance services for subsea assets. They use ROVs, 
deployed and supported by a mono-haul vessel, to execute light activities around the well 
(but not inside it). The acronym IMR is a non-standard attempt to categorise and group 
these activities based on their complexity. 
One of the most important activity types is control module replacements. These are 
replaced on failure, an indication of an indication of low criticality assessment for unit 
failures and an assumption constant failure rate i.e. the flat portion of the Bath-tube 
curve. Dependability is assured through (a) stocking of modules (b) improving modules 
reliability through partnerships with the OEM (c) improving the efficiency of their 
replacement on failure. The last measure was the subject of this investigation. 
To be efficient, the vessel’s operational limit must be suitable for the North Sea 
conditions.  Time spent waiting on favourable weather is lost. Modern vessels can 
operate at 5m Hs, and after 6m diminishing returns set in. Subsea production systems are 
designed and installed for easy replacement, adequate access, colours & marking, work 
platforms and snagging points. Each location is assumed amenable to execution of 
maintenance activities. If this assumption holds, difference in the levels of difficulty of 
each activity would depend on the activity type, the tools & procedures deployed, but not 
the site conditions. This assumption allowed the analysis and comparison of jobs 
executed across dozens of different subsea production systems. Each activity type is 
designed for standardised access (vertical or horizontal) and lifting requirements. Job 
types include inspections, valve operations, module handling and light construction. 
There are at least three inspection benefits: quality assurance, compliance with regulation 
and defect management.  Most inspection results confirm that the structure has no 
defects and deterioration, and is still within operational limits. This provides assurance of 
the design criteria. Retention of the platform certification is conditioned on a successful 
program of inspection. The management of defects is important for the retention of the 
asset integrity, maintenance of production availability and avoidance of HSE impact. 
This could also have reputation and legal dimension.   
Up to 1988, Legislation concerning inspection focused more on the more expensive and 
risky underwater structures and pipelines. To retain its certificate the structure must be 
inspected periodically and operated according to pre-approved manual. This requires 
prior notification of all changes, conditions and plans that could inform a special survey. 
The periodic surveys are optimised through a risk-based selection of portions of the 
underwater structures for inspection. These are rotated each time so that the structure is 
covered in 5 years to align with the 5yearly recertification.  
Performance improves as the skills relevant tasks are learnt and applied automatically. 
Individual improvement or learning curve depends on his abilities, motivation and as 
well as opportunities made available. Dynamics in performance can arise from changes in 
the people executing the tasks or providing the services e.g. through training or 
motivation (Changing Subjects Model) or result from changes in the “determinants of 
performance” i.e. Changing Tasks Model. 
We have focused on the task factors that determine performance variability. Data on the 
task factors that might influence performance was more readily available. The required 
minimum experience, qualification for each operational specialist and marine job position 
are always complied with. The ROV crew is dedicated. From the author’s own 
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experience the Project is results oriented and focused.  The key identifiers of high 
technology firms applies: employing high proportion of scientist & technical staff, high 
RD spend, rapid obsolescence, rapid growth and expertise derived from different 
disciplines used to solve ill-defined & elaborate problems. 
Complexity may be seen in terms of the difficulty of solving a problem – measured in 
time and in space i.e. memory requirements. IMR projects have a high degree of 
abstraction, several dimensions, co-opt many disciplines, to at different levels of 
difficulty which are analysed and ordered in procedures groups into task plans.  The most 
difficult jobs have visualisation aids. Predicting the performance of such a complex 
operation will require multiple variables. For convenience, these simplified to a handful of 
variables.  Five measures of complexity were adopted for this Masters Thesis (job 
novelty, tool novelty, lifting, vessel movements and interfaces). Whereas complexity 
relates to the difficulty or challenge the job requires, the uncertainty refers to our inability 
to completely specify a subsea intervention beforehand. This is not always a bad thing.  
IMR services contract is a mix of M&M and PBO types of contracts. There is a fixed day 
rate for the Vessel and equipment. The initial scope of work is flexible. IMR Services for 
Subsea assets can be described as Type 3 i.e. Product + Total Service. The Operators 
buys in all the routine and non-routine maintenance (including repairs) required to retain 
the reliability and availability of the subsea assets. Each of the three performance 
management models: Balanced Scorecard, (b) EFQM and (c) Scandia Navigator measure 
results and its enablers, over the long-term and in line with the company strategy. They 
all recommend people and relationships development to fire innovation. However, only 
EFQM is BOTH inherently scaleable and easily applicable to intellectual capital. Even 
EFQM could not used as IMR projects are temporary, with different products and 
dispersed customer. Given the data available, the appropriate KPI is the schedule 
variance, measured by SPI which simplifies to Planned Duration/Actual Duration. This 
was calculated for each of the job reviewed. 
Eight hypotheses were developed for investigation: SPI dependence on water depth, 
weather, complexity, uncertainty, complexity mix; as well as Project trend in efficiency 
and innovativeness. Water depth was taken as the installation depth of the SPS in 
kilometres. Weather disruption potential was related to the operability for the job type 
for the location and month of the year. Five and three measures, respectively, were 
developed for complexity and uncertainty. These were coded for the entire job inventory.  
The SPI data was first analysed in bulk. This indicated that depth, complexity and season 
of the year maybe important, but not how much so. It also pointed to the fact more than 
three variables would be required to represent the variation in SPI. The MVA analyses 
demonstrated that a linear model is reasonable and a power law is not. The best linear 
model used the maximum score for the complexity sub-terms and average of MOC & 
Scope Change. It returned an R2 of 53.9% with all the four variables significant; and 
correlation matrix of 0.31 maximum value. 
A predictive model based on the MVA was proposed. This suggested that SPI is lowest 
in the summer months with more conducive operability, for all job types. The differences 
in SPI between simple and more complex operations are increased during the winter 
months. A change of 160m in water depth or 0.20 weather operability can swing SPI by 
1.14 even when the ideal SPI is 1.0. These are realistic occurrences. 
From the model alone, we conclude that SPI increases with increase in water depth, 
disruptions (weather & equipment), complexity and uncertainty (H1, H2 H3, H4, H5 
respectively). It can also be inferred from the model that H6 is true i.e. SPI depends on 
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mix of complexity, especially in the winter months. A decision on H7 & H8 (efficiency 
and innovativeness) cannot be reached from the model. The number of jobs available 
form each of 2006, 2007 & 2008 is not sufficient for separate MVA studies.  
The model is simple and easy to use, as it has only four variables. Operability and water 
depth data is easily available. Complexity assessment is simplified by the requirement for 
the maximum only. However, none of the three uncertainty terms can be known before 
the job commences, which reduces its predictive value. 
MVA analyses carried out show that water depth is the most influential variable followed 
by disruption potential, then complexity and uncertainty. A change of 160m in operating 
water depth is enough to swing the SPI by 1.14. It would require a  change in 0.2 in 
disruption potential to achieve the same performance swing, equivalent to re-scheduling 
of an operation by a couple of months. Complexity and Uncertainty are 4 and 2 times 
less influential on SPI respectively, when compared to Disruption Potential; 3.2 and 7.3 
times less influential when compared with Water Depth. 
To allow for a potentially more robust study in the future, the data capture should not 
only be more formalised, it should also be automated. A significant portion of the 
interaction between the factors is dynamic, unstable and random, which increases the 
noise terms in the linear model. Potential errors due to data quality, language problems 
could be resolved through extensive reviews and investigator with Norwegian skill. This 
would allow the data prior to 2006 to be accessed. The availability of actual operability 
Figure for 5m operations would improve accuracy of modelling. 
Personnel competence and motivation levels cannot be easily coded and need not be. 
Temporal issues of day & night operations, tour durations etc may have more value 
especially as shift has increased to 14 operational days. A method for representing 
urgency of jobs would also allow them to be incorporated in the analyses. Such a code 
should be implemented in the planning system. 
The effect of equipment availability is a significant contributor to overall disruption 
potential. Ignoring this random effect simplified the model. Including it in future 
attempts could improve Operability from 50% (worst case) to 89% (best case). We have 
assumed the best case in the model. 
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7. APPENDIX 
7.1 MODULE REPLACEMENT PROCEDURE 
• Precautions, approvals & permit 
• Rig guide wire GW is to open Protection Cover (C-Hook with 1Te Weaklink) 
• Weather forecast for the operation period is acceptable 
• Set up SCM Running Tool and replacement SCM according to OEM procedure 
• Prepare GW, Torque Tool and Work Class ROV with TT waterjet and 
manipulate camera 
• Launch ROV and Obtain Clearance for PC opening 
• Lower GW to 20m above seabed, locate with ROV and connect with hatch 
• Gently lift PC open checking water current direction, tension etc 
• Disconnect and repeat for other covers 
• Perform As found Survey. Use ROV + waterjet to clean relevant area 
• Hold Point. Get clearance for hydraulic disconnections. Disconnect hydraulics. 
• Hold Point. Get clearance for electrical disconnections. Disconnect electrical 
jumpers. 
• Inspect Mini Guide Posts (MGP). Use GW to perform a tension test to max op 
tension 
• Vessel to 50m offset. OEM to confirm operation can go ahead. 
• Skid the SCMRT  to MHS, connect to crane lift via the ROV hook. 
• Lower the cursor frame prongs into the SCMRT funnels 
• Lift SCMRT and skid the pallet out of the moonpool area. Open moonpool 
doors. 
• Verify SCMRT “soft landing” dampers are fully extended – approx. 300 mm 
• Deploy first GW (nearest template) to approx. 20 m above the template. 
• Lower GW to guidepost receptacle and latch into anchor. Ensure fully latched. 
• Repeat last two steps for second GW 
• Deploy SCMRT & lower to 20m above template while moving vessel into 
position.  
• Activate AHC mode on crane as vessel enters final position above template. 
• Position vessel above landing area while taking up slack on the GW’s. 
• Engage the GW winch into CT mode.  
• Connect the GW runners / taglines from the main wire to the GW’ers. 
• Land the SCMRT observing the engagement of the MGP into the guide 
funnels. 
• Disconnect & Lift the main wire approx. 20m above SCMRT.  
• Set crane into normal lift mode 
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o 
Fig 1.9: Module Handling
 
• Operate the SCMRT according to OEM procedure. 
• OEM Rep to declare the SCMRT / SCM ready for recovery 
• Lower  Crane wire down to SCMRT  and connect ROV hook to SCMRT. 
• Lift the SCMRT / SCM to 20 m above the template. Disconnect the taglines. 
• Offset vessel 50m. Pay out on GWs as required. ROV to monitor wires on 
MGPs.  
• Lower cursor into moonpool. 
• Recover the SCMRT back into the cursor and up on deck. 
• Disconnect the closest GW & recover. Disconnect the second GW and 
recover. 
• Close the moonpool doors. 
• Skid pallet with SCMRT transport skid into moonpool and land SCM onto the 
vacant guideposts. 
• Disconnect recovered SCM from SCMRT, according to OEM procedures. 
• Prepare new SCM. 
• Repeat last 27 steps to install new SCM etc. 
• Reconnect hydraulic and electrical jumpers. 
• Commission in accordance with the Client’s written instructions. 
• Perform as-left survey of the SCM, MCM and Valve Panels. 
• ROV to survey the locking hinge and interfaces. 
• Reverse PC opening procedures 
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Fig 1.10: Umbilical & Module Cabling
 
 
7.2 SPOOL POOL BACK OPERATION 
 
This was the first time such operation was performed with Project vessel. The objective 
was to relocate a spool along the seabed to relieve tension on the hubs. A survey had 
been done to map out spool profile on the seabed during installation of the spool. 
Because of the very high level of accuracy required to determine the spool offset, its 
accurate position was re-measured before the spool was relocated.  
Concrete cylinders are traditionally piled along the pipeline profile and the pipe is sprung 
around it. In this case the cylinder was applied to provide permanent support for the 
spool leaving the spool resting against the cylinder.  
The spool needed to be pulled back and restrained into another profile. As shown, a 
spacer was provided between the spool and the concrete cylinder to act as a bumper 
between the spool and the cylinder during installation. The material and size had to be 
designed by Engineering department. Then, a chain hoist the pulling tool which is 
regularly used on the surface had to adapted and tested for subsea operations to pull the 
spool into position before the concrete cylinder was installed. The ROV operable chain 
hoist was connected to a pipeline initiation pile located approx 30m north of spool 
before it was tensioned and the spool moved.  Replacing the handle with a standard 
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ROV handle and retrofitting some seals to preserve its working life underwater was done 
to modify the chain hoist. Once the spool was pulled back to the required profile, new 
concrete cylinder where installed to restrain it. The Project Engineer’s role is to manage 
this process, QA/QC the subcontractors and resolve conflicts that may arise in the 
interfaces 
 
7.3 DESANDER REPLACEMENT 
The Client would like to recover a 71.3Te Desander from a 200feet deep subsea 
production system from time to time.  Normally the sand from this well would be 
pumped into an injection well but this option had become unavailable. The Project was 
requested to check the feasibility of recovering a filled de-sander and installing another 
one. Normally the Project Vessel would be limited to a maximum load of 35Te (for MH 
job types). To accommodate this unusual operation the following modifications were 
proposed for consideration 
a) Reconfigure crane for 100Te AHC with OEM support. This requires a software 
upgrade. 
b) Remove a portion of cargo rail (1m, temporarily) to provide sufficient clearance 
for the  7.2m high module 
c) Build a skidding system for new and old module or optionally allow for a port 
call in between retrieval and re-installation 
d) Upgrade the Vessel anti-heeling system to cope with the heavier weight. 
Project Vessel was considered very attractive for this operation because the Client owns 
the schedule and thus could maximize the uptime of the desander between retrieval and 
minimize the downtime when filled. As Vessel was optimised for IMR activities, it 
needed to be verified for this operation.  
To this end, a deployment analysis was carried out. This showed that the operation could 
be done with a limitation of around 2m Hs (with a DAF of 1.3). This is stringent but 
achievable even in the winter. Maximum installation duration of 3days is expected. A 
slightly longer period would be required for mobilisation, following modifications. 
At the time of this Masters Thesis other options were still being considered. Included 
was the use of other Vessels (with similar and larger crane sizes), or even a rig. Whilst a 
decision had not been reached, it is clear that it is an attractive and innovative project. 
Similar projects are likely to become available in the future. So a demonstration of 
competence and capability in this 100Te area would position the Project and Vessel very 
well competitively. 
 
Table 8.4: Overview of Jobs analysed
Jobs Plan Actual SPI Jobs Plan Actual SPI Jobs Plan Actual SPI Jobs Plan Actual SPI
Condn Montrg & Fault Finding CM & FF 10 1036 680.3 0.66 21 960 474.7 0.49 29 1694 1050.6 0.62 60 3690 2205.57 0.60
Valve Ops & Comm VO 6 234 233.2 1.00 11 288 302.7 1.05 27 764 786.1 1.03 44 1286 1321.99 1.03
Module Handling MH 11 984 1138.1 1.16 9 660 478.1 0.72 15 870 1058.5 1.22 35 2514 2674.68 1.06
Light Inter (Repairs, Constr, Pigging) RW/LC/PO 25 2256 2189.9 0.97 17 2088 2869.7 1.37 25 2300 2686.3 1.17 67 6644 7745.94 1.17
Total for the year 52 4510 4241.5 0.94 58 3996 4125.2 1.03 96 5628 5581.5 0.99 206 14134 13948.2 0.99
Total 2006 - 2008
 
2006 20082007
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Table 8.5: Summary Output for Power Law check
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.26268 Model Logarithm of the Variables 
R Square 0.06900 Add 1 to each assessment to remove zeros
Adjusted R Square 0.04769 Model Complexity & Uncertainty Variable Separately
Standard Error 0.34555
Observations 182
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4 1.5752 0.3938 3.297988959 0.012323514
Residual 178 21.2539 0.1194
Total 182 22.8291
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
Water Depth -0.0395 0.0299 -1.3192 0.1888 -0.0985 0.0196 -0.0985 0.0196
Disruption Potential 0.0505 0.0635 0.7950 0.4277 -0.0748 0.1758 -0.0748 0.1758
Complexity 0.1294 0.0520 2.4896 0.0137 0.0268 0.2321 0.0268 0.2321
Uncertainty 0.1898 0.1546 1.2282 0.2210 -0.1152 0.4948 -0.1152 0.4948  
 
Occurrence of Disruption Across Jobs
2008 Jobs (133 with disruption data)
Ship/CraneObsROV WorkROVWeather
# Jobs 13 9 1 25
Probability 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.19
2007 Jobs (107 with disruption data)
Total Ship/Crane ObsROV WorkROV Weather
# Jobs 107 18 18 3 2
Probability 0.17 0.17 0.03 0.02
Days 263.05 4.14 5.00 1.49 0.70
Hours 6313.2 99.3 120.1 35.8 16.8
Percent 100.00 1.57 1.90 0.57 0.27
2006 Jobs (87 with disruption data)
Total Ship/Crane ObsROV WorkROV Weather
# Jobs 87 10 4 7 4
Probability 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.05
Days 193.77 7.68 0.55 2.76 7.97
Hours 4650.6 184.3 13.2 66.2 191.2
Percent 100.00 3.96 0.28 1.42 4.11
average 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.08
0.87 0.91 0.96 0.92
Table 8.6: Causes of disruptions in jobs
 
 
 
 
